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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF POOR PEOPLE TO
APPEAL WITHOUT PAYMENT OF FEES: CONVERGENCE OF
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION IN M.L.B. v. S.LJ.
Lloyd C. Anderson*
In this Article, Professor Lloyd Anderson examines the recent decision M.L.B. v.
S.L.J., in which the United States Supreme Court held that due process and equal
protection converge to require that states cannot require indigent parents who seek
to appeal decisions terminating their parental rights to pay court costs they can-
not afford. Noting that this decision expands the constitutional right of cost-free
appeal from criminal to civil cases for the first time, Professor Anderson discusses
the characteristics a civil case should have in order to qualify for such a right.
Professor Anderson proposes a number of other civil cases, primarily those in
which a fundamental right is at stake, in which poor people should also have a
constitutional right to appeal without payment of court costs.
INTRODUCTION
In M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,' the Supreme Court of the United States re-
cently held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states
from requiring poor people who seek to appeal decrees that ter-
minate their parental rights to pay fees they cannot afford.2 Until
this decision, the Court had never held that an indigent litigant in
any type of civil case had a constitutional right to appeal without
payment of fees, even though such a right has existed in criminal
cases for nearly half a century since the Court's decision in Griffin
v. Illinois.3 The M.L.B. decision raises a long-dormant question: To
what extent does the U.S. Constitution guarantee a right of in forma
pauperis4 appeal in civil cases? After the Court granted certiorari in
* Professor of Law, University of Akron Law School. BA. 1969, University of Michi-
gan;J.D. 1973, Harvard University Law School.
1. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
2. See id. at 128.
3. 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states
from conditioning indigent defendants' right to appeal on payment for a trial transcript).
4. The Latin term in forma pauperis has been widely used to mean engaging in
litigation without prepayment of court costs. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 779 (6th ed.
1991). Virtually every state and the federal government permit, in varying degrees, indigent
persons both to file original actions and to appeal adverse decisions without prepayment of
filing fees and other court costs. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1994); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 453.190(1) (Mitchie 1996); ALASx.A R. App. P. 209(a)-(c); MAINE R Civ. P. 91(a),(f). This
Article focuses only on appeals and examines only the question whether the Federal
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M.L.B., commentators observed that, if resolved favorably to the
indigent parent, the decision "could bring massive changes in ap-
pellate law",5 and "could have a dramatic impact nationwide."6 After
the decision was released, however, commentary was more cau-
tious, ranging from the view that M.L.B. was not likely to become
viable precedent7 to the position that, although the decision was
"narrow," the "door is now open"8 to expand the right of in forma
pauperis appeal to other types of civil cases. Noticeably absent in
the media reaction was any prediction that the M.L.B. decision had
created a vast new constitutional right that would require massive
overhaul of state appellate systems.
The central question posed by the M.L.B. decision is whether
the newly declared constitutional right to appeal in forma pauperis
in civil cases is limited solely to termination of parental rights, or
whether it is applicable to additional, but tightly circumscribed,
civil cases in which fundamental rights are at stake, or whether the
door is now open to create a general right of in forma pauperis ap-
peal in many, if not all, civil cases. Much of Justice Ginsburg's
majority opinion is devoted to distinguishing parental termination
Constitution requires a state that does not permit informa pauperis appeals for all civil cases
to do so. Related to this issue is the broader question of the extent to which the Federal
Constitution guarantees a right of access to the courts, including a right to counsel and to
government funding of legal services. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and
Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights-Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1164-65
(1973); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-37, 16-51 (2d ed.
1988).
This Article's scope is limited to the prepayment of appeal fees in appeals as a matter of
right, including parental termination proceedings. At several points in its opinion in M.L.B.
v. S.LJ., the Court noted that a parent has the right to appeal a termination decree in Mis-
sissippi. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 108, 119. In civil cases in which the court has discretion
whether to grant appellate review, it appears highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would
declare a constitutional right for indigent persons to seek such review free of charge. Com-
pare Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963) (holding that when a state provides
appeal of right in criminal cases, it must provide free appellate counsel to indigent defen-
dants sentenced to prison), with Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 617-19 (1974) (holding that a
state is not required to provide free counsel to indigent defendants filing a discretionary
appeal).
5. Frank J. Murray, Mother Who Lost Her Parental Rights Seeks Ruling on Free "Pauper' Ap-
pea WASH. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1996, at A3, available in 1996 WL 2950191.
6. Stephanie Stone, U.S. Supreme Court to Decide Whether Indigent Mom Can Appeal Order
Terminating Parental Rights, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Apr. 5, 1996, available in 1996 WL 259533
(expressing the view of Professor Michael Featherstone).
7. See Stephanie Hinz, Supreme Court's Recognition of Indigent Parents' Right to Appeal
Loss of Children Could Open Door in Other Civil Areas, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Dec. 26, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 734133 (expressing the view of Professor David Luban).
8. Joan Biskupic, Justices Give Indigent Parents Greater Access to Civil Appeals, WASH.
POST, Dec. 17, 1996, at A2; see also Editorial, Protecting Parent's Rights, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Dec. 21, 1996, at 32, available in LEXIS, News Library, Slpd File (characterizing
the decision as "a small, but welcome step").
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decrees from general civil actions on the ground that such decrees
cause a unique deprivation: permanent, irretrievable destruction
of the judicially recognized fundamental interest in maintenance
of the parent-child relationship.9 One state court has ruled that an
indigent husband has no right to appeal informa pauperis a divorce
decree because such a right in civil cases is limited to parental ter-
mination cases.' ° Seizing upon the fundamental interest theme,
one federal appellate court has held that an indigent prisoner has
no right to appeal in forma pauperis a decision upholding his con-
finement in administrative segregation because a prisoner has no
fundamental interest in remaining in the general prison popula-
tion." On the other hand, notingJustice Ginsburg's reliance upon
the fundamental nature of family relationships in general and the
parent-child bond in particular, of which parental termination
cases are a subset, one state court has indicated an indigent parent
may have a right to appeal in forma pauperis in all "child access
cases," including custody decrees.
1 2
The constitutional theory upon which M.L.B. is based is that,
concerning barriers to appeal, equal protection and due process
concerns converge." The Court's key analogy to a parental
termination appeal was Mayer v. Chicago,4 in which the Court
expanded the right of in forma pauperis criminal appeal to
misdemeanor or "quasi-criminal" cases in which the defendant
9. SeeM.L.B.,519U.S. atl16-24.
10. See Tuttle v. Tuttle, No. 01A01-9512-CV-00546, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 685, at *5
n.4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 1997). For a criticism of this decision, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 187-190. Even if M.L.B. proves to be so limited, other lower courts have opined
that the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the fundamental importance of parent-child
bonds requires other constitutional protections aside from waiver of appeal fees. See, e.g.,
Adoption of Katherine, 674 N.E.2d 256, 258 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (finding that, in an ac-
tion to dispense with parental consent to adoption, the statutory standard of parental
unfitness must be applied with great specificity and adherence to the statutory standard); In
re R.A.T., 938 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Tex. App. 1997, writ denied) (holding that, in an action to
terminate parental rights, a new statutory ground for termination may not be applied retro-
actively). Such issues, however, are beyond the scope of this Article.
11. See Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g), which prohibits a prisoner from proceeding informa pauperis if he has had three
previous actions dismissed as frivolous, is not unconstitutional as applied to a suit claiming
illegal confinement in administrative segregation).
12. See Miller v. Bosley, 688 A.2d 45, 49 n.7 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (holding that
the decision in M.L.B. is not retroactive); cf Wolinski v. Browneller, 693 A.2d 30, 40-41, 44
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (finding that infringement upon a parent-child relationship is
not severe enough in a custody case to require strict scrutiny; nevertheless, the failure to
provide a rebuttable presumption that a parent's proposed schedule of visitation with
grandparents is in a child's best interest serves no valid state interest and therefore violates
due process of law).
13. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 120-21.
14. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
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does not face incarceration, but only a small fine and potential
collateral civil consequences. Although one may lament the lack
of a clear choice between due process and equal protection, the
Court has now resurrected the convergent theory of constitutional
interpretation that provided the original impetus for establishing a
constitutional right to in forma pauperis appeal. 6 This theory
appeared to be dead a quarter century ago, 17 which led some to
conclude that the Court had effectively slammed the door shut to
further expansion of the right of informa pauperis appeal.' Indeed,
in resurrecting this convergent theory in M.L.B., the Court
rejected the argument that in forma pauperis appeals amount to a
constitutionally-mandated affirmative state subsidy,19 the specter of
which led the Court a quarter-century ago to abandon the
convergent theory.0 If the Court has accepted the proposition that
in forma pauperis appeal is not a subsidy, it may have thereby
removed the underlying policy rationale for narrowly
circumscribing the right of in forma pauperis appeal and opened
the door for expanding this right beyond the fundamental interest
pigeonhole.
This Article will explore the question of what, if any, other types
of civil cases may or should qualify for informa pauperis appeal. Part
I will describe the evolution of the constitutional right of in forma
15. See id. at 196-97.
16. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) (holding that due process and equal
protection, taken together, require that a defendant convicted of a felony be permitted to
appeal informa pauperis). One federal appeals court has already recognized that the M.L.B.
decision has resurrected the theory that principles of due process and equal protection
converge with respect to access to court issues. See Miller v. Smith, 115 F.3d 1136, 1140-43
(4th Cir. 1997). The Miller court further held, however, that an indigent defendant was not
unconstitutionally denied his right to a free transcript for appeal when the state required
him to accept representation by a public defender in order to receive a free transcript. See
id.
17. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 658-61 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S.
434, 443-46 (1973); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374-81 (1971) (stating that the
determination of whether due process or equal protection rights are violated by fees im-
posed on indigent civil litigants is to be conducted as separate and distinct analyses).
18. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 4, §§ 16-44, 16-51. The Court in this era treated "nearly
every claim of access to civil proceedings as a floodgate that must be kept closed at all costs;"
noting rather presciently, however, that "matters of state-determined personal status in the
domestic relations area, such as child custody or annulment, may be able to meet the test."
Id. § 16-51, at 1650 n.27.
19. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 125 (stating that petitioner was not seeking "state aid to sub-
sidize privately initiated action" but was "endeavoring to defend against the State's
destruction of her family bonds, and to resist the brand associated with a parental unfitness
adjudication").
20. See Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L.
REv. 213, 283-90 (1991).
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pauperis appeal from its source in Griffin v. Illinois,21 which relied
on the theory that due process and equal protection converge to
form this right, to the counterrevolution of the early 1970s, in
which the Burger Court abandoned the convergent theory and
limited the right of cost-free appeal to cases in which fundamental
interests are at stake and such interests can be vindicated only
through processes monopolized by the state.22 This Part will con-
tend that the broader purpose behind this counterrevolution was
to eliminate the use of equal protection to impose affirmative gov-
ernmental obligations to remedy wealth disparities through
subsidies, but that the Burger Court overshot its own goal by mis-
takenly viewing in forma pauperis appeal as a state subsidy rather
than what it actually is: removal of an insuperable state-imposed
obstacle to a service-appellate review-voluntarily provided by
the state.
Part II will review M.L.B. v. S.L.J itself and explain how the ar-
guments of the parties, as revealed in their briefs and at oral
argument, framed the issue before the Court very narrowly:
Whether the right of in forma pauperis appeal extends at least to
civil cases in which fundamental interests are at stake. Part II will
also discuss the various opinions written by the Justices and con-
tend that the opinions themselves reveal that the decision in
M.L.B. is open to at least three interpretations: (1) that it is limited
exclusively to parental termination appeals, (2) that it extends to a
narrow category of other civil appeals in which a fundamental in-
terest is at stake, and (3) that it extends to, if not the general run
of civil appeals, at least appeals in which the appellant will suffer
severe consequences to unusually important interests if the judg-
ment stands.
Part III will construct a model, based upon the Court's jurispru-
dence, of the characteristics an appeal must, or probably should,
exhibit in order to qualify for constitutionally required in frna
pauperis appeal: (1) an interest that at least is more important than
the interests at stake in general civil appeals, and preferably one
that has already been determined to be fundamental; (2) a judg-
ment that at least will have severe effects on the asserted interest
and, preferably, which will result in total and permanent destruc-
tion of the interest; (3) a successful appeal will vindicate the
asserted interest, although it need not be the only means to vindi-
cate the interest; and (4) the appeal can be characterized as a
21. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
22. See discussion infra Part I.B.
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means of vindicating the asserted interest, rather than as a man-
dated subsidy to redress wealth disparity.
Based upon this model, Part IV will discuss various candidates
for in forma pauperis treatment and contend that the strongest can-
didates for such treatment are appeals in which a recognized
fundamental interest is at stake, the judgment will permanently
destroy the interest, and an appeal is the sole means to vindicate
the interest. Such appeals include involuntary civil commitment,
removal of life-sustaining equipment, denial of permission to ter-
minate a minor female's pregnancy, denial of adoption, denial of
permission to marry, and grant of fault divorce. Appeals that are
plausible, but less likely, candidates for in forma pauperis treatment
are cases in which an unusually important but not clearly funda-
mental interest is at stake, the judgment will severely but not
permanently impair the interest, and an appeal is not the exclusive
or even essential means to protect the interest; such appeals in-
clude paternity and child custody decrees. Finally, the general run
of civil cases are poor current candidates for a constitutional right
of informa pauperis appeal because no distinctive interest is at stake
in such cases. Nevertheless, Part IV contends that two themes in
M.L.B.-that due process and equal protection converge in this
area and that in forma pauperis appeals are not mandated subsidies
for the poor-provide support for the proposition that eventually
this right should be extended to all civil cases. The Article con-
cludes that this right ought to, and eventually will, apply in all civil
cases, although reaching that point is likely to be a very gradual
process, starting with cases in which fundamental interests are at
stake, expanding to cases in which nonfundamental but unusually
important interests are at risk, and extending finally to all civil
cases.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF INDIGENT
PERSONS TO APPEAL WITHOUT PAYMENT OF COURT FEES
A. The Source: Criminal Appeals and the Convergence
of Due Process and Equal Protection
Four decades before the M.L.B. decision, a closely divided Su-
preme Court ruled in the seminal case of Griffin v. Ilinois23 that the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from requiring an indi-
23. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
[VOL. 32:3
Convergence of Due Process and Equal Protection
gent defendant in a criminal case to pay for the trial transcript in
order to appeal a conviction when the appellate court requires an
examination of the trial proceedings. 4 Justice Black, in an opinion
that commanded only a plurality of four justices, reasoned that
due process and equal protection require that criminal trial pro-
cedures be free of invidious discrimination because the prime goal
of courts is to assure that all persons are accorded equality in
court.25 Since a rule requiring indigent defendants to prepay court
costs in order to defend themselves at all would violate due process
and equal protection, so does a rule requiring prepayment of ap-
pellate fees. The Court stated: "There is no meaningful distinction
between a rule which would deny the poor the right to defend
themselves in a trial court and one which effectively denies the
poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all who have
money enough to pay the costs in advance." 6 Justice Black con-
cluded that due process and equal protection prohibit invidious
discrimination at both the trial and appellate levels.27 Although his
opinion is replete with ringing phrases about equal protection, 2 it
does not rely exclusively on equal protection but instead asserts
that due process and equal protection together prohibit the in-
vidious discrimination resulting from requiring indigent criminal
defendants to prepay court costs in order to appeal their convic-
tions.29 Thus was born the theory that due process and equal
protection converge to prohibit states from erecting insuperable
financial barriers at the appellate as well as the trial court level. In
addition, not a single word in the plurality opinion indicates that
the right of in forma pauperis appeal should be limited to criminal
cases or that it should be limited to cases in which a "fundamental"
interest is at stake.
The deciding vote in Griffin was cast by Justice Frankfurter. His
opinion disclaimed any reliance on due process because, in his
view, the right to appeal is not fundamental to the protection of
life and liberty, and therefore due process of law does not require
a state to allow any appeal at all. ° Turning to equal protection,
Frankfurter declared that neither a state's right to deny appeal al-
together nor its authority to make appropriate classifications
24. See id. at 12.
25. See id. at 17.
26. Id. at 18.
27. See id.
28. See, e.g., id. at 19 ("There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has.").
29. See id. at 18-19.
30. See id. at 20-21 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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"sanctions differentiations by a State that have no relation to a ra-
tional policy of criminal appeal or authorizes the imposition of
conditions that offend the deepest suppositions of our society.
' 1
He concluded that allowing only defendants who can afford a tran-
script to appeal trial errors while shutting off appeal for indigent
defendants constitutes a "squalid discrimination."3 2 Thus, at its
source, the convergent theory of due process and equal protection
did not command a majority view.
The dissenting opinion by Justice Burton33 agreed with Justice
Frankfurter that due process does not require states to supply in-
digent defendants with free transcripts on appeal because there is
no constitutional right to appeal and that, therefore, when a state
permits an appeal, due process does not prohibit it from differen-
tiating among defendants concerning the conditions for making
an appeal.34 The close question, and the point of Burton's disa-
greement with Frankfurter, is whether the particular
differentiation in this case-affording a free transcript to indigent
defendants sentenced to death while requiring payment in all
other criminal appeals-violates equal protection. In Burton's
view, the "actual practice of law" recognizes valid distinctions be-
tween capital and noncapital cases because the penalty of death in
a capital case is unique.' Moreover, equal protection is not denied
when, in a state that makes appeal available to all, some impover-
ished defendants cannot satisfy the conditions of appeal because
"Illinois is not bound to make the defendants economically equal
before its bar ofjustice. 3 6
Justice Harlan expanded upon this point in a separate dissent-
ing opinion in which he argued that the equal protection
underpinning of the Court's decision implicated a broader vision
of constitutional theory, that "the Equal Protection Clause imposes
on the States an affirmative duty to lift the handicaps flowing from
differences in economic circumstances." 37 Frankfurter's reply to
this point is important because the Harlan-Burton view that provid-
ing a free transcript on appeal amounts to an affirmative economic
subsidy for the poor was at the root of the Burger Court counter-
31. Id. at 22 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
33. The dissent was joined by Justice Harlan, see id. at 26 (Burton, Minton, J.J., dissent-
ing), who years later authored the narrow decision in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971). For a discussion of the triumph ofJustice Harlan's narrow formulation of indigents'
right to cost-free appeal, see discussion infra Part I.B.
34. See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 27 (Burton, MintonJ.J., dissenting).
35. See id. at 27-28 (Burton, Minton,J.J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 28 (Burton, Minton,J.J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 34 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
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revolution of the 1970s which cut off, until M.L.B., further expan-
sion of the right to appeal in forma pauperis.m Agreeing with
Burton's premise that the law must address actualities, Frankfurter
argued that it defies reality to suggest that a state affords an oppor-
tunity of appeal to defendants who cannot pay fees required by the
state and that it is not the state that is responsible for the indigent
defendant's inability to appeal.39 Further agreeing with the dissent-
ers' premise that equal protection does not require a state to make
everyone economically equal, Frankfurter argued that in farna
pauperis appeal is not a subsidy to redress wealth disparities but is
rather a remedy for an insuperable barrier erected, not by the in-
digent defendant, but by the state; therefore, the state is
responsible for the inability to appeal. 40 Thus, the issue of whether
and to what extent the Constitution guarantees a right of in forma
pauperis appeal became enmeshed in a broader debate over
whether equal protection imposes upon government an affirma-
tive duty to remedy wealth disparity through subsidies and, if not,
whether such a right amounts to a subsidy.
Justice Harlan's Griffin dissent contended that, if imposing fees
upon indigent defendants in felony cases is invidious discrimina-
tion,4' then fees in misdemeanor appeals should also be struck
down because "an invidious classification offends equal protection
regardless of the seriousness of the consequences."42 He accurately
foresaw the implications of Griffin's logic. Fifteen years later, in
Mayer v. Chicago,45 the Court extended the right of in forma pauperis
appeal to misdemeanor appeals in which the defendant has not
been sentenced to prison.4
In Mayer, the defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct and
interference with a police officer and fined $250 for each offense.45
He sought to appeal on the grounds of evidence insufficiency and
prosecutorial misconduct; however, he appealed without paying for
the trial transcript because he could not afford it.46 In a unanimous
opinion, the Court first adopted the reasoning of the Griffin plurality
that due process and equal protection converge to prohibit
invidious discrimination and that imposing fees on indigents as a
38. For a discussion of the Burger Court counterrevolution, see infra Part I.B.
39. See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 23 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
40. See id. at 23-24 (Frankfurter,J., concurring).
41. The petitioners in Griffin had been convicted of the felony of armed robbery. See
id. at 13.
42. Id. at 35 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
43. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
44. See id. at 189.
45. See id. at 190.
46. See id. at 190-91.
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condition of appeal constitutes invidious discrimination because
the ability to pay costs bears no rational relationship to whether
the indigent is innocent or guilty. 47 Second, the Court rejected the
argument that Griffin should not be extended to nonfelony cases
and stated that ability to pay costs is no more related to guilt or
innocence in a nonfelony than in a felony case. Finally, the Court
rejected an argument that Griffin should not be extended to cases
where the defendant is not subject to imprisonment but only to a
fine. The Court emphasized that Griffin did not balance the
interest of the defendant against the fiscal interest of society, but
rather prohibited the invidious discrimination which results from
depriving indigent defendants of the opportunity to appeal that is
available to defendants who can afford to pay costs. 49 The Court
further asserted that, even if the gravity of the litigant's interest
were relevant, in forma pauperis appeal would still be required
where physical liability is not at stake because a fine can be as
burdensome to an indigent as incarceration, and conviction alone
carries the possibility of collateral consequences even more serious
than incarceration. 50 Likewise, the state's countervailing interest in
saving money is minimal when compared to its long-term interest
in avoiding hostility among the poor toward its courts.51
Nevertheless, it is clear that the major rationale of Mayer is that
imposing costs upon indigents as a condition of appeal constitutes
invidious discrimination, regardless of the interest at stake's
gravity.
Since Mayer was a unanimous opinion, it appeared to resolve
several uncertainties of the Griffin decision. First, the Court ac-
cepted the theory that due process and equal protection converge
to establish a prohibition against invidious discrimination in the
form of appellate costs that indigent litigants cannot afford.52 Sec-
ond, the major premise for the conclusion that imposing costs on
indigents constitutes invidious discrimination is that such costs
bear no rational relation to the primary purpose of the courts,
which is to determine guilt or innocence. The assertion that, even
when a defendant is not subject to imprisonment, serious financial
or collateral consequences outweigh the State's minimal interest in
47. See id. at 193-94.
48. See id. at 195-96.
49. See id. at 196-97.
50. See id. at 197 (explaining that the adverse collateral consequence faced by the
Mayer defendant, a medical student, was that a misdemeanor conviction might bar him
from the practice of medicine).
51. See id. at 197-98.
52. See id. at 193-94.
[VOL. 32:3
Convergence of Due Process and Equal Protection
avoiding costs, was subsumed within this major premise.13 Whether
one focuses on the Court's major premise or its subsidiary asser-
tion, however, it is clear that Mayer did not rely upon a conclusion
that a "fundamental interest" was at stake.
B. The Burger Court Counterrevolution
Broad statements in Griffin and Mayer that all persons must be
accorded equality in court without regard to economic status and
that fees which prevent the poor from obtaining judicial review
have no rational relation to the goal of determining guilt or inno-
cence, coupled with nearly a dozen other cases stating that the
poor need not run an unnecessary gauntlet of procedures in order
to establish their right to waiver of fees,54 provided support for an
argument that the right to waiver of fees should be extended to
civil cases. The first extension to civil cases was Boddie v. Connecti-
cut,55 where the Court held that states are prohibited from
requiring the poor to pay court costs in order to file for divorce.
56
The Court's opinion was authored by Justice Harlan, who had dis-
sented in Griffin. Accepting that the rationale of Griffin covered the
issue of filing fees, Justice Harlan emphasized numerous times
throughout the Boddie opinion that requiring the poor to pay filing
fees denied them access to the courts. Reasoning that due process
reflects the fundamental value that affording all persons access to
court for resolution of disputes is an essential element of a cohe-
sive society, and that due process guarantees the opportunity for a
hearing and prohibits rules that deprive individuals of this right,
Harlan concluded that refusing to admit divorce petitioners into
court is equivalent to denying them the opportunity to be heard.57
These themes of access to courts and opportunity to be heard sup-
ported the argument that the Constitution guarantees a broad
53. See id. at 196-97.
54. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963) (holding that provid-
ing free appellate counsel for indigent defendant only if the appellate court determined an
appeal might have merit violates the Fourteenth Amendment). See generally TRIBE, supra
note 4, § 16-38 (summarizing other such cases).
55. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
56. See id. at 374.
57. See id. at 377-80.
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right of access to courts that states cannot deny to the poor by re-
quiring payment of fees they cannot afford.58
Strangely, however, although he relied on Griffin, Harlan es-
chewed any reliance on equal protection or the convergence of
equal protection and due process; he instead relied exclusively on
due process. Absent from the opinion is any notion that denying
access to court for divorce petitioners unable to pay filing fees
while permitting access for persons able to pay is a denial of equal
justice. Instead, Harlan reasoned that due process prohibits denial
of access to court for divorce because marriage occupies a basic
position in our hierarchy of values and the state has a monopoly
over the means of dissolving a marriage. 9 After referring to access
to courts and the opportunity to be heard a number of times, Har-
lan emphasized that his reasoning was no more than necessary to
decide this case and that the decision was not to be read as a con-
stitutional guarantee of access to court for all individuals in all
circumstances. 60 The narrowest basis upon which to decide this
case was that the right of access is a "precondition to the adjust-
ment of a fundamental human relationship" and that petitioners
had no alternative but to "resort to the judicial process."6' These
limitations on the holding in Boddie supported the interpretation
that the right of access to court in civil cases existed only where a
"fundamental" interest was at stake and the state exercised mo-
nopoly power over vindication of that interest. Thus, the Court's
expansion of Griffin and Mayer to civil cases, albeit at the trial court
rather than appellate level, was ambiguous: it could be interpreted
either as a step toward establishing a broad constitutional right of
access to court in civil cases or as establishing such a right solely
for civil cases in which a fundamental interest is at stake and the
state exercises a monopoly over vindication of that right.
The Court wasted little time in adopting the narrow interpreta-
tion of Boddie. In United States v. Kras, a slim 5- majority of the
Court held that the Constitution does not prohibit the govern-
ment from requiring payment of court fees as a condition of filing
for bankruptcy.63 Noting that the Boddie Court emphasized its rul-
ing went no further than necessary to decide that case, that it was
58. See, e.g., Arthur B. LaFrance, Constitutional Law Reform for the Poor: Boddie v. Con-
necticut, 1971 DuKE L.J. 487, 523-37 (1971) (analyzing the implications of Boddie);
Michelman, supra note 4, at 1161-63.
59. See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374.
60. See id. at 382-83.
61. Id. at 383.
62. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
63. See id. at 450.
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sufficient in Boddie that a fundamental interest was at stake, and
that the state held a monopoly over vindication of that interest,
64
the majority in Kras held that these two factors were not merely
sufficient, as Boddie held, but essential to waiver of fees. Comparing
divorce to bankruptcy, the majority found that divorce involves
interests of basic social importance whereas a bankrupt's interest
in discharging debts, though important and embodied in statute,
"does not rise to the same constitutional level." 65 Moreover,
whereas the exclusive means for dissolving a marriage is to petition
a court, a debtor has alternative means for resolving financial
problems, such as negotiating a settlement with creditors.66 Having
found no due process violation, the majority next analyzed
whether the bankruptcy fee requirement violated equal protection
as an issue distinct from, rather than convergent with, due proc-
ess;6 7 the opinion contains not a single reference to Griffin or
Mayer. Finding that no fundamental interest is at stake in bank-
ruptcy and that bankruptcy legislation entails economic and social
welfare regulation rather than a suspect classification such as race,
the fee requirement was satisfied by the mere rational basis that it
was designed to make the bankruptcy system pay for itself.
68
The ruling in Kras was quickly extended to payment of court
fees as a condition for appeal. In Ortwein v. Schwab,69 another bare
5-4 majority of the Court held that it is not unconstitutional to re-
quire payment of appellate court filing fees by persons who cannot
afford them in order to appeal decisions reducing welfare bene-
fits. 70 Aligning with Kras rather than Boddie, the Court held that
welfare appeals do not implicate a fundamental interest of consti-
tutional dimension.7' Moreover, as in Kras, indigent appellants
have an alternative to a judicial remedy in the form of a free
64. See id. at 441-44 (discussing Boddie).
65. Id. at 445.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 446. Since bankruptcy is primarily regulated by federal, rather than state,
legislation, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was the applicable provision in
Kras rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment does not contain an
explicit equal protection guarantee, but its Due Process Clause has been construed to in-
clude an equal protection component, so that principles of equal protection are applicable
to federal action pursuant to the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499 (1954). See generally TRIBE, supra note 4, § 16-1, at 1437 ("The due process[] of the fifth
... amendment[] ha[s] been held to yield norms of equal treatment indistinguishable from
those of the equal protection clause." (citations omitted)).
68. See Kras, 409 U.S. at 446-48.
69. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
70. See id. at 660. Although the petitioner in Ortwein had sought judicial review of an
administrative decision to reduce his welfare benefits, the state characterized such review as
an appeal rather than as an original action. See id. at 658.
71. See id. at 658-59.
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agency hearing.72 Thus, imposition of appeal fees was held not to
violate due process. 5 After considering equal protection sepa-
rately, the Court concluded, as in Kras, that welfare payments "'are
in the area of economics and social welfare,' ,74 that poverty is not a
suspect classification, and that fees are a rational means of offset-
ting court operating expenses. Once again, the Court ignored
Griffin and the convergence of due process and equal protection
that was its constitutional underpinning.
Boddie, Kras, and Ortwein thus rejected the notion that the Four-
teenth Amendment guarantees a general constitutional right of
access to courts and established an odd theoretical framework in
which claims of right to proceed in forma pauperis were measured
by a convergence of due process and equal protection principles in
criminal cases but by analytically distinct principles of due process
and equal protection in civil cases. Moreover, Boddie, Kras, and
Ortwein cemented the fundamental interest/government monop-
oly regime in civil cases. Ortwein, in its reliance on the notion that a
welfare recipient has an alternative to appeal in the form of an ini-
tial hearing, could even be interpreted as holding, in effect, that
there is never a constitutional right to appeal in forma pauperis be-
cause, by definition, in every civil case there is always the
"alternative" to which the Court referred: Inherently, there has
already been a hearing, the result of which the loser seeks to ap-
peal.
The Boddie-Kras-Ortwein regime is subject to three major areas of
criticism. First, the Court majorities in Kras and Ortwein mischarac-
terized the facts of those cases in ways that concealed what was
actually at stake. In Kras, the majority stated that the bankrupt had
an alternative to prepayment of filing fees in the form of agreeing
to pay the fees in small monthly installments. 7 5 The actual record,
however, revealed that the bankrupt had sworn in an uncontro-
verted affidavit that he could not make such a promise because,
after necessities, he had absolutely no money left, and the district
court made a finding of fact based on that affidavit. 76 By finding
that the bankrupt could afford to pay in installments, the majority
substituted its own finding of fact for one based on uncontroverted
testimony, in apparent violation of the rule that findings of fact
72. See id.
73. See id. at 659-60.
74. Id. at 660 (quoting Kras, 409 U.S. at 446).
75. See Kras, 409 U.S. at 436.
76. See id. at 458-59 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
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shall not be set aside unless "clearly erroneous." 7 Similarly, the
Ortwein majority stated that a welfare recipient has an alternative to
appeal in the form of an agency hearing.78 There had already been
an agency hearing in that case, however, in which it was deter-
mined that Ortwein's benefits should be reduced, and thus the
only means to vindicate his asserted interest in continued benefits
was an appeal. By mischaracterizing the initial hearing as the al-
ternative to appeal, moreover, the Ortwein majority reached a
result that could be interpreted, as previously indicated, as mean-
ing that there is never a constitutional right to appeal in forma
pauperis because an appeal, by its very nature, seeks to correct the
initial error of an agency or trial court.
The second major criticism of these cases is that they rely upon
an unprincipled distinction between "fundamental" interests over
which the state exercises monopoly power and interests deemed to
be less important. In establishing a general rule that the poor have
no constitutional right of access to the courts in civil cases, Kras
and Ortwein isolated Boddie as "a single, unprincipled exception."
79
One principle that supposedly distinguished Boddie from Kras and
Ortwein is that interests deemed fundamental are deserving of
greater constitutional protection than less important interests,s°
but the interest at stake in Boddie--dissolving a marriage-is not
expressly protected in the text of the Constitution itself. Instead,
this interest is deemed fundamental because it is implicit in the
values associated with freedom."' An American society that suppos-
edly values the sanctity of marriage and the cohesiveness of family
might be perplexed by the notion that a person's desire to dissolve
a marriage and family is essential to a cohesive and ordered soci-
ety. Similarly, if law ought to be grounded in reality,82 it would be
extremely difficult to explain why a bankrupt-faced with financial
ruin through no fault of his own, pursued by a vengeful creditor,
unable to support a widowed mother and a child with cystic fibro-
sis, 3 among others-or an elderly welfare recipient-stripped of
77. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-75 (1985) (holding that a find-
ing of fact-is not clearly erroneous when based upon a permissible view of the evidence);
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
78. See Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 659-60.
79. TRIBE, supra note 4, § 16-51, at 1650.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 63-68.
81. See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374, 376.
82. Cf supra text accompanying notes 30-36, 38-40 (discussing the views of Justices
Burton and Frankfurter).
83. This was the situation of the petitioner in Kras, 409 U.S. at 437, described by one
commentator as "Dickensian." TRIBE, supra note 4, § 16-51, at 1648.
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the ability to obtain food, clothing, or shelter"-has less at stake
than an unhappy couple who do not wish to remain married. The
distinction cannot be based solely on the ground that all consti-
tutionally protected interests are deemed fundamental, because
only some such interests are deemed fundamental.85 Indeed, the
interest in continued receipt of welfare benefits (which was at
stake in Ortwein) has been a constitutionally protected property
interest for over a quarter century,8 6 but it is not deemed funda-
mental. 7 Even accepting the proposition that some constitutionally
protected interests deserve greater protection than others because
they are more vulnerable to political abuse by the majority, it is
difficult to explain how unhappy marriage partners are more po-
litically vulnerable than welfare recipients. More fundamentally,
such a consideration is irrelevant to the issue of court fees. Such
fees are applied across the board, to rich and poor alike, so there
is no basis for suspicion that legislatures were motivated by hostility
toward the politically weak poor population.8 8 What is left of the
distinction drawn in Kras and Ortwein, then, is the "supposition
that constitutional interests are peculiarly important."s9 Many
claims and defenses recognized by common law, however, protect
against invasions of liberty and personal integrity and therefore
have a "right" at their core equally as "important" as the right to
divorce.90
The final point of criticism is that, if the Court's reliance on the
lack of a fundamental interest was unprincipled, ' there is a
deeper, unspoken reason for Kras and Ortwein. The Burger Court
84. The petitioner in Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 656, faced similar facts.
85. For a discussion of those constitutionally protected interests that are not deemed
fundamental, see JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 13.4(d), at 468-72 (3d
ed. 1986).
86. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970). But see Rebecca E. Zietlow, Giving
Substance to Process: Countering the Due Process Counterrevolution, 1997 DENVER U. L. Rav. 9,
36-38 (1997) (contending that the Welfare Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110
Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), which states that welfare benefits are
no longer entitlements and delegates wide discretion to states in administering welfare
programs, may lead the Court to rule that welfare benefits are no longer a constitutionally
protected property interest).
87. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-87 (1970).
88. SeeMichelman, supra note 4, at 1212.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 1212-15.
91. It is worth noting that the Burger Court was no stranger to the creation of new
fundamental interests. The Burger Court, for example, minted a new, unenumerated fun-
damental right to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152-54 (1973); see also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990)
(finding a fundamental right to refuse life-sustaining medical equipment). Thus, Kras and
Ortwein cannot be explained on the basis that the Court had established a flat rule against
creation of new unenumerated fundamental interests.
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had an overriding concern that equal protection not be used to
impose judicially mandated affirmative obligations upon the states
to remedy wealth disparities and thus effect a redistribution of
wealth in America. 92 Even accepting the validity of this constitu-
tional philosophy, however, it is irrelevant to the question whether
a pauper has a right to a waiver of court fees. The Warren Court
itself, which in Griffin used the notion of equal justice under law to
first establish such a right,93 did not extend this notion (with one
exception) to other areas, such as requiring states to provide
minimum levels of welfare benefits or educational funding.
94
Moreover, the proposition that equal justice under law prohibits a
state from bolting the courthouse door closed to a pauper who
cannot afford fees does not lead inevitably to, or even provide
strong support for, a conclusion that states must act affirmatively
to redistribute wealth in society. If one accepts that the state does
not cause an individual to become poor, then requiring the state
to alleviate poverty by, for example, providing minimum levels of
92. This concern arose in the Burton-Frankfurter debate. See supra text accompanying
notes 30-40. Although Kras and Ortwein did not rely overtly on the proposition that waiver
of court fees constitutes a subsidy for the poor, later decisions of the Burger Court ex-
pressed a constitutional philosophy that, although the Constitution requires a compelling
justification for governmental interference with the exercise of fundamental rights, only a
rational basis is required for government refusal to pay for the exercise of fundamental
rights. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980) (holding that government refusal
to pay for medically necessary abortions of poor women does not impinge on the funda-
mental right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy). The Harris Court explained:
To translate the limitation on governmental power implicit in the Due Process
Clause into an affirmative funding obligation would require Congress to subsidize
the medically necessary abortion of an indigent woman even if Congress had not en-
acted a Medicaid program to subsidize other medically necessary services. Nothing in
the Due Process Clause supports such an extraordinary result. Whether freedom of
choice that is constitutionally protected warrants federal subsidization is a question
for Congress to answer, not a matter of constitutional entitlement.
Id. (citation omitted).
One commentator has contended that the Burger Court's constriction of the fundamen-
tal rights strand of equal protection, reflected in decisions such as Kras, was not motivated
by hostility to discovery of new unenumerated fundamental rights, but rather by opposition
to conceptualizing equal protection as an entitlement to affirmative government funding.
See Klarman, supra note 20, at 285-91. Seizing upon this anti-subsidy constitutional philoso-
phy, the state in M.L.B. made it the centerpiece of its argument that the transcript fee did
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. See Brief for Respondents at 9, 30, M.L.B. v. S.LJ.,
519 U.S. 102 (1996) (No. 95-853) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents] (arguing that neither
due process nor equal protection is violated by the state's failure to "subsidize the costs of
an appeal").
93. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29.
94. See TRIBE, supra note 4, § 16-37, at 1628 n.4. The one exception was guaranteeing
equal access to the political process. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 666 (1966).
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welfare benefits or education funding, can be characterized as im-
posing an affirmative obligation to redress wealth disparity. In the
case of appeals, however, the state voluntarily has decided to pro-
vide a service-appellate review-but then erected a barrier-
court fees-which the poor cannot surmount. Thus, prohibiting a
state from denying an indigent's appeal for failure to pay fees can-
not be characterized accurately as imposing an affirmative duty to
subsidize the poor, because the state itself is responsible for the
indigent's predicament.
This distinction between removing state-imposed barriers and
mandating affirmative state subsidies can be illustrated by two dif-
ferent approaches to government funding of abortion. The first
such approach would be for the legislature to vote to finance the
creation of government-run abortion clinics, but to require women
who seek abortions at such clinics to pay a fee which some women
cannot afford. In such a case, it is the government itself which has
erected an obstacle to the service, for having made available abor-
tion services, it has closed the clinic doors to indigent women who
cannot afford the fees. Thus, a judicial order prohibiting the exac-
tion of the fees from poor women would not constitute an
affirmative subsidy-for the legislature voluntarily decided to pro-
vide the service-but rather the removal of a state imposed
obstacle to a poor woman's right to decide whether to terminate
her pregnancy.
The second approach would be for the legislature to decide to
fund free medical care for the poor, except for abortion services.
In this instance, government has not made abortion services avail-
able at public cost. A court order requiring government to make
such services available to poor women would, therefore, be a judi-
cially imposed affirmative subsidy.
95
Prohibition against charging appellate costs to indigents is
analogous to the first approach because the government has made
available appellate review but has also erected an obstacle to its use
by the poor. The fact that government will end up paying the costs
of paupers' appeals does not mean that waiver of such costs would
amount to the affirmative entitlements so feared by the Burger
Court. The crucial distinction is that government is not required to
95. This second approach is the one rejected by the Court in Harris, 448 U.S. at 306-
11. Whether the Court's ruling that the Constitution does not impose an affirmative obliga-
tion to pay for the exercise of a fundamental right was correct is beyond the scope of this
Article and, therefore, the author expresses no opinion on that issue. This decision is noted
here solely as a means of illustrating the distinction between prohibiting government inter-
ference with the exercise of rights and mandating affirmative support for the exercise of
rights.
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provide appellate review-it has voluntarily provided it-but
rather is prohibited from denying the poor access to its service. As
one commentator noted, "the Burger Court, in its eagerness to
curtail the notion of constitutional entitlements to government
benefits, inadvertently overshot its target and legitimized patent
government discrimination against the poor."
96
Regardless of the validity of these criticisms, however, the practi-
cal effect of the Burger Court decisions was to erect a wall between
criminal and civil appeals: States were prohibited from requiring
paupers to prepay costs in criminal appeals but were free to do so
in civil appeals.97 A quarter century passed before the Court again
expressed interest in this issue. During this period, the lower fed-
eral courts consistently refused to extend Griffin to civil cases on
the ground that no fundamental interest was at stake.98
II. M.L.B. v. S.L.J
A. The Facts
It is difficult to imagine a more sympathetic figure than Melissa
Lumpkin Brooks. 99 She was born in rural Mississippi. Her father
was a sawmill worker, her mother a factory hand. She grew up in
poverty, quit school at age 16, and met and married Sammie
James. They had two children. After eight years of marriage, they
separated, she unemployed and he the owner of a small business
with a three bedroom house on ten acres. When they divorced, she
96. Klarman, supra note 20, at 284.
97. The one breach in this wall was Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), which held
that a statute which required tenants who appeal eviction orders to post bond equal to dou-
ble the monthly rent violated equal protection because no rational basis existed for the
imposition of such a requirement only on appellants classified as tenants. See id. at 74-78.
98. See, e.g., Nickens v. Melton, 38 F.3d 183, 184-85 (5th Cir. 1994) (requiring pris-
oner who claimed that a guard deprived him of property during a search of his cell to
prepay costs of appeal did not violate equal protection); Edward B. v. Paul, 814 F.2d 52, 55-
56 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that a handicapped child appealing denial of appropriate free
education was not entitled to proceed informa pauperis); Piatt v. MacDougall, 773 F.2d 1032,
1034-35 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that waiver of fees was not required in appeal of denial of
prisoner wages); Hill v. Michigan, 488 F.2d 609, 610 (6th Cir. 1973) (holding that no waiver
of fees was required in appeal of employment termination); Nelson v. Bank of Mississippi,
498 So. 2d 365, 366 (Miss. 1986) (finding no right to appeal informa pauperis in a suit to set
aside deed).
99. This is the name of the petitioner in M.L.B. v. S.L.J. The Supreme Court of Missis-
sippi used initials to describe the parties, but their full names are contained in the original
pleadings. See Brief for Petitioner, at Parties, M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (No. 95-
853) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
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agreed to grant custody of the children to Sammie and to pay child
support, and he agreed to allow her reasonable visitation. Three
months after the divorce, Sammie remarried and, a year later, he
and his new wife sued to terminate Melissa's rights as a parent in
order for the new wife to adopt the children.100 Their petition
alleged that Melissa had abandoned the children by not visiting
them and that she was behind on her child support payments. The
petition did not allege that Melissa had abused the children.0  The
case was hotly contested. At the conclusion of a three-day trial, in
which both sides were represented by counsel, the trial judge
granted the petition. The opinion cited no evidence or reasoning
in support of the decision but merely recited the statutory grounds
for termination, including parental abuse, which the petition had
not even alleged and of which there was no evidence12
Melissa sought to appeal on the ground that the decision to
terminate her parental rights was unsupported by the evidence.
She paid the required $100 filing fee and moved to waive the re-
quirement that she pay for the trial transcript on grounds that it
would cost over $2000, an amount she could not afford. The Su-
preme Court of Mississippi denied her motion, citing the statute
requiring prepayment for the transcript.1 0 3 Thus, a young mother
whose failed marriage had left her poverty-stricken and who had
voluntarily agreed to let her two small children live in their child-
hood home with their father was, just over a year later, faced with
the prospect of losing her children forever on grounds that were,
at worst, nonexistent, and, at best, unclear in light of the evi-
dence. 0 4 Her last chance to remain her children's mother was an
appeal she could not afford.
These facts, however, while perhaps making Melissa Lumpkin
Brooks an appealing figure, reveal several legal difficulties with her
request for a waiver of appellate fees. The Burger Court had di-
vorced due process and equal protection principles in the area of
100. This is the name of the respondent in M.L.B. v. S.L.J. For the factual details de-
scribed above, I am indebted to a former student, Karen Butera, who wrote a seminar paper
on this case, obtained these details through conversations with Ms. Brooks and her attorney,
and gave me permission to use them.
101. By statute, Mississippi has specified the grounds upon which courts may terminate
parental rights, including abandonment, unfitness or abuse. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-15-
103 (1994).
102. This description of the trial-level proceedings is derived from the Brief for Peti-
tioner, supra note 99, at 3, and was not disputed.
103. See id. at 4-7.
104. The nonexistent ground cited by the trial court was abuse, which had not been al-
leged and of which there was no evidence. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 108 n.1 (1996).
The alleged ground was abandonment, but the trial court cited no evidence to support this
conclusion. See id. at 108.
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access to courts. Due process, in isolation, offered little prospect
for success because she did not contend that the trial was funda-
mentally unfair. Because there is no constitutional right of appeal,
states that afford a right of appeal are generally free to impose rea-
sonable conditions upon those who choose to appeal. 05 With
respect to equal protection, it was firmly established that poverty is
not a suspect classification that would trigger strict scrutiny of the
fee requirement.0 6 She could plausibly contend that a fundamen-
tal liberty interest in maintenance of the parent-child bond was at
stake but, as was the case in Ortwein, she had an alternative means
for vindicating that interest-the hearing she had already had.' °7
Despite these difficulties, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the Mississippi Supreme Court's decision not to waive the
transcript fee. 1s
B. The Briefs and Oral Argument: The Framing of a Narrow Issue
Petitioner M.L.B.'s brief to the Supreme Court emphasized that
the Court could rule in her favor without establishing a broad con-
stitutional right of in forma pauperis appeal in a wide range of civil
cases. First and foremost, she argued, the Court's own precedents
had established that, in a proceeding to terminate parental rights,
a parent has at stake a fundamental liberty interest in preserving
the parent-child relationship. Drawing a comparison with Mayer v.
Chicago,°9 she contended that if an interest in avoiding payment of
a fine and possible "collateral consequences" in a criminal misde-
meanor case is sufficiently fundamental to require waiver of appeal
fees, surely a mother's interest in preserving a relationship with
her children is even more fundamental. 0
Her second argument was that appellate review is a vitally
important means of protecting this interest because the reversal
rate in termination cases demonstrates that there is a significant
105. SeeMcKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1894).
106. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
107. For a discussion of this alternative in Ortwein, see supra text accompanying notes
72, 78.
108. See M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 517 U.S. 1118 (1996). The U.S. Supreme Court has jurisdiction
to review by writ of certiorari the final judgment of a state's highest court which presents a
question of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1994).
109. 404 U.S. 189, 197 (1971) (explaining that, with respect to petty offenses, "the
State's long-term interest would not appear to lie in making access to appellate processes
from even its most inferior courts depend upon the defendant's ability to pay").
110. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 99, at 8-9, 11, 13, 17.
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risk of error in trial court findings.11' The difficulty with this
argument was that the Court in Ortwein had already rejected a due
process challenge to appellate fees partly on the ground that the
petitioner had an alternative to vindication of his interest in the
form of an initial hearing.12 Petitioner in this case also had such an
alternative, the termination trial. Instead of confronting this
difficulty directly, M.L.B.'s Brief finessed it with her third
contention: Due process and equal protection converge with
respect to issues of access to court."3 By advancing this
constitutional theory, she invited the court to abandon the theory
underpinning Boddie, Kras, and Ortwein, which required a separate
analysis of due process and equal protection, and to return to the
original convergent theory of Griffin, in which the notion that an
appellant's interest is adequately protected by the initial hearing
never appeared in the Court's analysis.1
4
Finally, she emphasized that, as a practical matter, the Court
could rule in her favor without creating a broad constitutional
right of in forma pauperis appeal because her asserted interest is
fundamental, unlike the vast majority of civil cases which do not
affect fundamental interests. Even within the area of parent-child
relations, such as custody determinations, she argued that termina-
tion is unique because it is permanent and leaves a parent with no
role whatsoever in the child's life." 5 Thus, the form of M.L.B.'s ar-
gument presented the Court with a narrow issue: Do principles of
due process and equal protection prohibit states from denying ap-
peal in cases where fundamental interests are subject to total and
permanent destruction, solely because the appellant cannot pay
state-imposed fees?
The State of Mississippi's brief asserted that striking the tran-
script fee requirement would lead to the establishment of a
constitutional right of free appeal in a broad array of civil cases.
The Court, argued the State, had erected a wall between criminal
and civil cases that guaranteed a right of free appeal only in crimi-
nal cases on the ground that no civil case threatens a litigant with
stigma and loss of physical liberty. To breach that wall would cre-
ate a new right for which there was no principled limit and would
impose huge costs on the states." 6 Taking issue with M.L.B.'s con-
stitutional theory, the State urged the Court to retain the form of
111. See id. at 9.
112. See Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 659-60.
113. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 99, at 10, 22, 30.
114. See Gfiffin, 351 U.S. at 12.
115. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 99, at 11, 27.
116. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 92, at 4-7.
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analysis established by Boddie, Kras, and Ortwein-that due process
and equal protection should be analyzed separately rather than in
combination."7 With respect to due process, the State relied on a
long line of precedent that there is no constitutional right to ap-
peal and that due process only requires a fair initial hearing.
11 8
Characterizing the right of free criminal appeal as an exception to
this rule based upon the loss of physical liberty or the stigma re-
sulting from criminal conviction, the State asserted that such harm
is not present in a parental termination case; to expand the excep-
tion on the ground that a fundamental right is at stake in a
termination case would be to require a state to. subsidize a poor
person's appeal. " 9 In repeatedly describing a free appeal as a sub-
sidy for the poor,1 2 1 the State was sounding an alarm that may have
been the Burger Court's unspoken reason to slam the door shut
on further expansion of in forma pauperis appeal: The Fourteenth
Amendment should not be used to impose affirmative obligations
on the states to redistribute wealth.1 2 ' The State argued that many
civil cases can be described as involving fundamental rights, par-
ticularly domestic relations cases such as divorce, paternity, and
child custody, making the subsidy enormous. 122 Turning to equal
protection, the State argued that the poor are not a suspect class'
and that Boddie had rejected the use of a fundamental rights-equal
protection analysis when fees of general applicability are at issue.
In her Reply Brief, M.L.B. responded to the State's argument
that due process is not violated if the initial hearing was fair by
asserting that, once a state creates a right of appeal, it cannot
arbitrarily deny it to some litigants, particularly when fundamental
rights are at stake. M.L.B. did not deny that a free transcript would
constitute a subsidy for the poor but contended that cost is
irrelevant when fundamental rights are at stake and that, even if
cost were relevant, the actual cost of a free transcript was far less
than the State had claimed. M.L.B. then denied that extending
the right of in forma pauperis appeal to civil cases where
fundamental interests are at stake would create a vast new right,
even in domestic relations, because, unlike any other civil case,
the parent-child bond is permanently destroyed by a termination
117. See id. at 32-34.
118. Seeid. at11-12.
119. See id. at 17-22.
120. See id. at 4, 9, 12-14, 27-30.
121. For a discussion of the Burger Court counterrevolution in this area, see discussion
supra Part I.B.
122. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 92, at 27-28.
123. See id. at 30-33.
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decree. 124 Replying to the argument that a wall exists between
criminal and civil cases that should not be breached, M.L.B.
reiterated her theme of fundamental rights: the Court has
repeatedly struck down state requirements that deprive the poor of
access to the courts when fundamental rights are at stake. Finally,
M.L.B. defined the difference in constitutional theory between her
and the State. Whereas the State urged that equal protection must
be analyzed in isolation from due process and that the Court had,
in Boddie, rejected a fundamental rights-equal protection analysis
for court fee requirements, M.L.B. urged that due process and
equal protection converge in this area. She explained that, when
fee requirements that the poor cannot afford are at issue in
termination cases, two fundamental interests converge-equality of
access to court and maintenance of the parent-child relationship:
"[W] hen the status of poverty is combined with measures that shut
people off from means to affect their government in cases
involving otherwise important interests, as in Giffin and Boddie, the
Court has carefully scrutinized those measures and generally has
struck them down."
1 2
At oral argument, the Justices expressed three major concerns.
First and foremost, numerous questions were asked about whether,
if the Court ruled in M.L.B.'s favor, there were limiting principles
by which the Court could avoid establishing a right of free appeal
for indigents in all civil cases, and particularly in all domestic rela-
tions cases. When asked whether such a right should extend to
child custody appeals, M.L.B.'s counsel answered that such an ap-
peal would not be as strong a candidate as a termination appeal
because an award of custody to one parent does not effect as se-
vere or permanent a deprivation of the other parent's relationship
with the child as does a termination decree; in a custody case, the
losing parent can visit the child, play a role in the child's life, and
seek a modification of custody. Counsel emphasized that the limit-
ing principle would be that, if a fundamental interest is at stake,
the deprivation must be severe and final in order to qualify for in
forma pauperis appeal.1 2 6 Another candidate for free appeal might
be a paternity appeal, speculated one Justice. M.L.B.'s counsel
conceded that this would be a strong candidate, but not as strong
as termination for two reasons. First, a termination decree is so
124. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1-4, M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (No. 95-
853).
125. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 99, at 18 (citation omitted).
126. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at *7-8, *19-21, *47-48,
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (No. 95-853), available in 1996 WL 587663 [hereinafter
Official Transcript].
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severe that the Fourteenth Amendment requires clear and con-
vincing evidence of the grounds for termination; a paternity decree
is not so severe as to require such a burden of proof. Second, there
is not a great need for a transcript in a paternity appeal because
blood tests alone can establish paternity with scientific near-
certainty.127 When asked about divorce appeals in a state where
fault must be proved, M.L.B.'s counsel struggled to explain why
the interest at stake is less important than in a termination appeal.
He was rescued, however, by one Justice who asserted that the dif-
ference is that in a divorce case at least one party asks the state to
give her something-a divorce-but in a termination case the par-
ent asks the state not to take something from her-a child. 28 In
essence, M.L.B.'s counsel argued that the court could rule in her
favor without committing itself to establishing a right of in forma
pauperis appeal in other civil cases because termination causes
complete and permanent destruction of a fundamental right not
found in any other civil case, with one possible exception: involun-
tary civil commitment, where deprivation of a fundamental right to
physical liberty is complete.
1 29
The second major area of concern at oral argument was the
Burger Court objection to using the Constitution as a vehicle to
redistribute wealth. When asked how requiring a free transcript on
appeal is different from requiring government to fund abortion,' 30
M.L.B.'s counsel answered that an indigent seeking a free tran-
script is not asking for a subsidy but merely seeking the same
protection that wealthier persons enjoy against arbitrary depriva-
tion.13' Justices pointed out several times that indigents are not
automatically entitled to free counsel, even in termination cases,
but M.L.B.'s counsel repeatedly drew the distinction that a free
transcript is not a subsidy because a transcript is a precondition to
127. See id. at *12-14, 36-39. The former assertion was based upon two Supreme Court
decisions, one holding that there must be clear and convincing evidence to support a ter-
mination decree, seeSantosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-70 (1982), but the other holding
that such a burden of proof is not required to establish paternity. See Rivera v. Minnich, 483
U.S. 574, 577-82 (1987).
128. See Official Transcript, supra note 126, at *50-53. This assertion ignores the fact
that, when fault divorce has been granted, the appellant is asking the state not to take away
her marriage.
129. See id. at *22-25 and 35-36. Mississippi already allowed informa pauperis appeal in
such commitment proceedings. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-21-83, 41-21-85 (1993). Thus,
counsel's assertion that there may be a constitutional right to waiver of costs in involuntary
civil commitment appeals did not pertain, as a practical matter, to Mississippi but only to
states, if any, that do not afford waiver of costs for such appeals.
130. In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), the Court held that government is not re-
quired to subsidize non-therapeutic abortions. See id. at 474.
131. See Official Transcript, supra note 126, at *8-9.
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any evidentiary appeal, whereas free counsel would be an attempt
to place indigents and wealthier opponents on an equal footing
during the litigation.
3 2
The question of what constitutional theory to apply in the case
provided the third primary area of debate. One Justice asked
whether the due process and equal protection analyses were iden-
tical and, given an assumption that it was reasonable to deny
appeal to a person who did not pay for a transcript, whether that
assumption would demonstrate that neither clause had been vio-
lated. M.L.B.'s counsel replied that, although due process and
equal protection converge in this area, they involve distinct inter-
ests: Due process is concerned with denial of access to appeal, and
equal protection is concerned with the arbitrary nature of denying
appeal to people who cannot afford the cost of those procedures.
3
Confronted with one Justice's view that there was no due process
violation because the requirement of a transcript was not a barrier
to appeal but merely a requirement that the appellant pay for it
and that M.L.B. could, therefore, prevail only on equal protection
grounds, M.L.B.'s counsel retorted that the requirement of paying
for a transcript is a barrier to appeal by the poor and that Griffin
was decided on both due process and equal protection grounds. 4
M.L.B.'s counsel elaborated on this point by stating that strict scru-
tiny of the transcript fee requirement was required because two
fundamental interests are at stake: maintenance of the parent's
right to a relationship with her child (equal protection) and accu-
rate determination of whether that right should be terminated
(due process).13
5
C. The Decision in M.L.B. v. S.L.J.
1. Opinion of the Court: Extension of Convergence Theory to Civil
Cases-By a 6-3 vote, the Court held that a state may not deny ap-
peal to an indigent parent seeking to appeal a decree terminating
her parental status on evidentiary grounds solely because she can-
not afford to pay for a transcript of the trial. 36 The majority
opinion for five members of the Court, authored by Justice Gins-
burg, first resolved the question of what constitutional theory to
132. See id. at *14-15, 21, 29-30.
133. See id. at *15-16.
134. See id. at *15-19.
135. See id. at *25-26, 31-34.
136. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 106, 128.
[VOL. 32:3
Convergence of Due Process and Equal Protection
apply to claims for in forma pauperis appeal. Viewing Griffin as the
"foundation case" concerning access to appeal, the majority noted
that the Griffin plurality relied on both due process and equal pro-
tection and that Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Griffin, had
emphasized the importance of the equal protection argument. 37
Justice Ginsburg explained: "The equal protection concern relates
to the legitimacy of fencing out would-be appellants based solely
on their inability to pay core costs," whereas "[t]he due process
concern homes in on the essential fairness of the state ordered
proceedings anterior to adverse state action."1 8 Thus, the M.L.B.
majority chose not to cabin in forma pauperis appeal within the
framework established by Boddie, Kras, and Ortwein and resurrected
the theory that both equal protection and due process concerns
must be weighed in combination to determine whether a state
must afford an indigent an informa pauperis appeal.139
The Court, then, for the first time extended the principles of
Griffin to civil appeals. Griffin was not limited to appeals in which
physical liberty is at stake, explained Justice Ginsburg, because in
Mayer only a $500 fine was being appealed; a misdemeanor convic-
tion can result in "serious collateral consequences" sufficient to
require in forma pauperis appeal.14° Boddie, Kras, and Ortwein estab-
lished that the rationale of Griffin does not extend to the general
run of civil cases, but in cases where states intrude upon family re-
lationships, close scrutiny of the state's justification for such
intrusion has long been required because choices about family re-
lationships are of basic importance in society.14 1 Justice Ginsburg
then made the key comparison that justified extending Griffin to
civil appeals: If the interest at stake in Mayer-possible effect on
professional prospects-was important enough to require waiver of
appellate fees, surely the interest at stake in M.L.B.-permanent
destruction of a parent-child relationship-is at least as impor-
tant.' Subjecting the transcript fee requirement to strict scrutiny,
the majority concluded that the state's justification-offsetting the
costs of its court system-was insufficient because there are rela-
tively few appeals in parental termination cases, making waiver of
137. See id. at 106, 110-11.
138. Id. at 120.
139. Perhaps uneasy about the implications of Justice Ginsburg's equal protection
analysis, a sixth Justice concurred on the ground that due process alone could provide the
rationale for requiring states to waive appeal fees for indigents in termination appeals. See
id. at 128-29 (KennedyJ., concurring).
140. See id. at 121.
141. Seeid.atl.
142. Seeid. at 121-23.
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transcript fees for indigents unlikely to impose undue burdens on
states. 143
The majority opinion also addressed the underlying question
whether affording a right of in forma pauperis appeal would violate
the principle, fought for so vigorously by the Burger Court, that
the Federal Constitution does not require government to provide
subsidies for private individuals to remedy affirmatively wealth dis-
parities not created by government. Far from asking the state to
subsidize her activities, the majority concluded, M.L.B. sought to
defend against the state's destruction of her bond with her chil-
dren.'4 In so doing, the majority recognized that an anti-subsidy
constitutional philosophy is not incompatible with a right of in
forma pauperis appeal for the simple reason that waiver of fees for
the poor is not a subsidy, but rather removal of an insuperable ob-
stacle created by government.
The majority was careful to note, however, that its decision did
not extend to civil appeals in general but only to cases in which a
fundamental interest is at stake. The factor that set M.L.B.'s case
apart from the general run of civil appeals, Justice Ginsburg em-
phasized, is that more than money was at stake: The state was
seeking to destroy forever M.L.B.'s relationship with her chil-
dren.145 Justice Ginsburg reaffirmed in dictum that Ortwein states the
general rule that fee requirements need only have a rational basis
and that the state's need to offset court costs is a rational justifica-
tion to charge fees, but M.L.B. is an exception to that rule. 46 She
even noted that not all domestic relations cases would necessarily
entail a right of in forma pauperis appeal--even though a funda-
mental interest in family relationships is at issue-because
termination works a unique deprivation; it permanently destroys a
family relationship without prospect for modification.147 Thus, on
the key question of what other civil cases might give rise to a right
of informa pauperis appeal, the M.L.B. majority can be interpreted
as saying not many, and maybe only parental termination.
2. The Dissent: Opening the Floodgates to a General Right of In
Forma Pauperis Appeal-Two of the three dissenters argued that
Griffin should not be extended to civil cases because the rationale
for such an extension, as a practical matter, cannot be restricted
solely to termination appeals, since many civil cases involve inter-
143. See id. at 122.
144. See id. at 125.
145. See id. at 127-28.
146. See id. at 123-24.
147. See id. at 127-28.
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ests just as important as parent-child bonds. 48 Taking the majority
to task first for its constitutional theory, Justice Thomas' dissent
described it as "ambiguous" and "murky" because it appeared to
rely primarily on equal protection but did not clearly disclaim reli-
ance on due process. The clear approach, in his view, was to
analyze the two clauses separately, as the Burger Court had done:
"If neither Clause affords petitioner the right to a free, civil appeal
transcript, I assume that no amalgam of the two does."'
4 9
With respect to due process, opined Justice Thomas, there is no
constitutional right of appeal, and due process is satisfied if the
initial hearing was fair, as it was in this case.' 50 Turning to the issue
of equal protection, Justice Thomas contended that Griffin should
not be extended to civil cases at all. Calling for the Court to ad-
here to the historical and constitutional distinctions between civil
and criminal actions, he argued that the majority's distinction be-
tween fundamental and less important interests has no principled
stopping point.5' The majority's comparison between Mayer and
M.L.B. most troubled Justice Thomas; if the gateway for a right of
in forma pauperis civil appeal is an interest at stake as important as
the interest of a person convicted of a misdemeanor (avoidance of
possible "collateral consequences"), numerous civil appeals would
also qualify, including, for example: paternity, custody, divorce,
zoning, and foreclosure. Insofar as the majority opinion could be
understood as an attempt to limit this right solely to termination
appeals, the attempt will fail, asserted Justice Thomas, since the
majority's relevant comparison is whether the interest at stake is as
important as that of a convicted misdemeanant:152 "In brushing
aside the distinction between criminal and civil cases-the distinc-
tion that has constrained Griffin for 40 years-the Court has
eliminated the last meaningful limit on the free-floating right to
appellate assistance.
"0 53
With respect to the subsidy issue, the dissenters argued that, to
the extent Griffin relied on equal protection, it presented the
theory that government has an affirmative obligation to remedy
wealth disparities, a theory now discredited, in their view. A free
transcript in a termination appeal is such a subsidy because,
148. See id. at 141-43 (Thomas,J, dissenting). These two dissenters also expressed their
view that Griffin itself should be overruled so that the Constitution would not require waiver
of any court fees in any case, civil or criminal. See id. at 139 (Thomas, J., dissenting). That
discussion is omitted here because it was not the issue before the Court.
149. Id. at 130 (Thomas,J. dissenting).
150. See id. at 131-32 (ThomasJ, dissenting).
151. See id. at 141-43 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 142-44 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 144 (Thomas,J., dissenting).
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although the parent is defending against the state's destruction of
her family bonds, she has no constitutional right of appeal. Rather,
she has privately initiated a right of appeal the state has chosen to
give her.
5
1
This examination of M.L.B.'s historical context, as well as the
contentions of the parties, reveals three major interpretations of
the Court's decision that may not appear as clearly from simply
reading the Court's opinion. The narrowest interpretation is that
states are prohibited from denying civil appeal by persons who
cannot afford court fees only in parental termination proceedings.
This interpretation derives from the fact that the majority's stated
rationale for extending Griffin to civil appeals is that, in a termina-
tion case, a fundamental interest is at stake in a way that is unique
in civil litigation: The state seeks permanent destruction of parent-
child bonds. A somewhat broader interpretation begins with the
fact that the actual holding of the case-i.e., what was essential to
the decision-is that permanent destruction of a fundamental in-
terest is sufficient to require waiver of fees, leaving open whether
such an interest is necessary or whether a lesser interest would also
be sufficient. From that starting point, one can interpret the ra-
tionale of M.L.B.-that Griffin extends to civil cases in which a
fundamental interest is at stake-as establishing a constitutional
right of in forma pauperis appeal in all civil cases in which any fun-
damental interest is at stake. Indeed, if the relevant comparison for
civil cases is the interest of one convicted of a misdemeanor in
avoiding payment of a fine and possible collateral consequences, a
fairly broad range of civil cases-although not the general run-
would qualify. The third interpretation, and the broadest of all, is
based on the resurrection of the theory that principles of equal
protection and due process converge on the issue of access to ap-
peal, coupled with the court's rejection of the notion that waiver of
appellate fees constitutes a subsidy of private activity. Seen in this
light, a cost-free appeal by a poor person in any civil case would
not be characterized as a subsidy at all, but simply as a guarantee
that two important interlocking interests will be vindicated: assur-
ing equitable access to the courts and reducing the risk of
erroneous determinations of fact and law.
154. See id. at 136-38.
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III. A MODEL FOR ASSERTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OF In Forma Pauperis APPEAL
Since the Court's general rule in M.L.B. is that states are not re-
quired to allow civil appeals by persons unable to pay court costs
and that parental termination appeals are an exception, it seems
clear that, for the foreseeable future, M.L.B. will not be extended
to the general run of civil cases. Whether the decision is likely to
be extended at all depends upon an examination of the character-
istics of a parental termination appeal that set it apart from civil
appeals in general. What follows is a discussion of four crucial fac-
tors that the Court focused on in M.L.B.: the nature of the interest
at stake, the nature of the deprivation of the interest, state mo-
nopoly over vindication of the asserted interest, and absence of
subsidy. These factors will then be applied in Part IV to describe
the most and least likely candidates for extending the constitu-
tional right of informa pauperis appeal.
A. The Nature of the Interest at Stake
The most important characteristic of M.L.B., because it pro-
vided the bridge from Griffin and criminal cases to civil cases,
involved the nature of the interest at stake, the fundamental inter-
est in maintenance of the parent-child bond. Having a
fundamental interest at stake clearly is sufficient to satisfy one of
the Court's requirements: The nature of the indigent appellant's
interest must be distinguishable from the interests at stake in ordi-
nary civil litigation. Whether such a fundamental interest is
essential is less clear. Beyond this starting point, however, the
M.L.B. decision is capable of two interpretations. The narrowest
interpretation is that only a fundamental interest will satisfy this
requirement, for this is how the Court distinguished M.L.B. from
Kras and Ortwein.
The broader interpretation of M.L.B. begins with the fact that
the case the Court said pointed most clearly to the result in M.L.B.
was Mayer If avoidance of a $500 fine and possible "collateral con-
sequences" to one's livelihood was a sufficiently important interest
to justify strict scrutiny of appeal fees, then preservation of the
parent's relationship with a child is important enough to justify the
same level of scrutiny. There was nothing "fundamental" about the
interest at stake in Mayer, and the M.L.B. Court established that it
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is not the label "criminal" that, in and of itself, establishes a right
of free appeal. Therefore, there is some force in the logic of Justice
Thomas' dissent that the court's actual finding was that Mayer and
M.L.B. involved interests that are unusually important in compari-
son to the general run of civil cases. If that is so, then surely Justice
Thomas is correct that the nature of the interests involved in many
civil appeals-domestic relations in particular-are also at least as
important as the interest of a convicted misdemeanant. Thus, it is
clear that having a fundamental interest at stake is sufficient to sat-
isfy the requirement that the appeal must be distinguishable from
civil appeals in general, but an interest comparable to avoiding
"collateral consequences" may also be sufficient. This is not to say,
however, that an indigent appellant will have a right to waiver of
costs whenever a fundamental interest is at stake because the
M.L.B. decision appears to set forth additional characteristics nec-
essary to qualify for in forma pauperis appeal.
B. The Nature of the Deprivation
Confronted with the State of Mississippi's argument that extend-
ing Griffin to civil cases in which fundamental interests-including
family relationships-are affected would "open the floodgates" to
in fomma pauperis appeals in a vast array of civil cases-particularly
in the huge volume of domestic relations cases, the Court in
M.L.B. explicitly distinguished parental termination from such
cases. For example, loss of custody permits a parent to retain a re-
lationship with the child, and custody can be modified or even
restored, whereas termination permanently destroys the relation-
ship. Similarly, the Court noted that paternity proceedings are
different from termination proceedings in that paternity decrees
impose legal obligations upon the biological parent whereas ter-
mination decrees destroy existing relationships. 5 6  Thus,
permanent destruction of the asserted interest clearly is sufficient
to satisfy the Court's requirement that an indigent appellant be
faced with the prospect of severe deprivation of her asserted inter-
est. It is less clear, however, that total deprivation is essential. In
neither of the cases relied on in M.L.B.-Griffin and Mayer-were
the deprivations permanently destructive. In Griffin, the defendant
was facing a term of years in prison, not life or death. In Mayer, the
155. See id. at 127-28.
156. See id. at 118 n.ll (citations omitted).
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"collateral consequences" had not occurred nor was it certain they
would ever occur. Thus, it is certainly arguable that, while perma-
nent destruction of the asserted interest is sufficient to satisfy the
deprivation factor, a serious risk that the asserted interest will be
irreparably harmed may also be sufficient.
C. State Monopoly Over Vindication of the Asserted Interest
In the Boddie-Kras-Ortwein line of cases, the Court placed some
importance upon whether the state arrogated to itself the sole
means for vindicating a litigant's asserted interest so that resort to
judicial process was the sole remedy available. In Kras, for exam-
ple, the Court cited the availability of a negotiated payment plan as
one reason for denying in forma pauperis filing status to a bank-
rupt,157 and in its opinion in M.L.B., the Court noted the presence
of this factor in Kras158 On the other hand, in Ortwein, the availabil-
ity of an administrative hearing was advanced as one factor that
justified a refusal to require waiver of fees in a welfare appeal, 59
but the Court in M.L.B. omitted any reference to this factor and
did not place any explicit weight on the fact that appeal is the sole
remedy for a decree terminating parental rights. Perhaps the pres-
ence of monopoly power in a termination appeal was too obvious
to require mention, for it is difficult to imagine any remedy for a
decree of termination other than an appeal. Moreover, the Court's
emphasis on the severity and permanence of deprivation in a ter-
mination decree may encompass the notion that appeal is the
parent's last resort. It therefore would appear that, where a liti-
gant's sole means of vindicating an asserted interest is an appeal,
that factor would carry some weight on the side of prohibiting a
state from imposing costs on an indigent.
It is not at all clear, however, that the presence of monopoly
power is a sine qua non. First, as previously discussed, if the avail-
ability of an initial hearing in a civil case is a reason to deny in
forma pauperis status, then no civil appeal could qualify for such
status. 16 In M.L.B., for example, the mother had a trial de novo, yet
the Court rejected the notion that such a hearing is a sufficient
157. See Kras, 409 U.S. at 445. For a discussion of this rationale in Kras, see supra text
accompanying notes 66, 75-77.
158. SeeM.L.B.,519U.S. atl15.
159. See Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 659-60. For a discussion of this rationale in Ortwein, see su-
pra text accompanying notes 72, 78.
160. See supra text accompanying note 78.
SPING 1999]
Univenity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
reason to uphold appeal costs as applied to an indigent. Moreover,
by resurrecting the principle that equality of access to appeal con-
verges with principles of fair procedure to determine whether
states are permitted to impose appeal costs on indigents, the Court
may have eliminated state monopoly as a significant factor, or any
factor at all, if invidious discrimination is prohibited among classes
of appellants. The availability of an initial hearing to one class
would not make it any less discriminatory to deny them the appeal
available to all others. Thus, where appeal is the only means avail-
able for vindicating an indigent appellant's interest, this factor may
carry some weight in determining whether a cost-free appeal is re-
quired, but it probably is no longer a necessary prerequisite and
may be no longer of much importance.
D. Absence of Subsidy
The Court decided in Ortwein that the Fourteenth Amendment
does not require waiver of appeal fees when an indigent appellant
asserts an economic or social welfare interest. 6 The Court did so
in an era when it was determined to prevent equal protection from
being used to impose affirmative mandates on the states to remedy
wealth disparities not created by the states.162 In such an environ-
ment, it was perhaps a natural impulse to characterize waiver of
appeal fees as a subsidy to the poor, because the states had not
created poverty. Indeed, the dissent in M.L.B. made just that ar-
gument. 163 The Court in M.L.B., however, rejected that argument
on the ground that the appellant was not seeking state aid to alle-
viate a wealth disparity which was not created by the state but was
seeking to defend against both state destruction of her parent-
child relationship and the stigma of being found an unfit parent'
The Court further reasoned that appeal fees have more than a dis-
parate impact on the poor: They impose a sanction-dismissal of
appeal-that is visited on the poor and on nobody else. 65 By not
characterizing waiver of appeal fees as a subsidy, but rather as a
removal of a state-created obstacle to defending against destruc-
tion of a fundamental interest, the Court appears to have accepted
the proposition that, at least for indigent defendants, such waivers
161. See Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 660.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
163. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 136-37 (Thomas,J, dissenting).
164. See id. at 125.
165. See id. at 127.
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are not a subsidy for the poor. In addition, insofar as the Court's
rationale for rejecting the subsidy argument is that fee require-
ments constitute a sanction imposed solely upon the poor, such a
rationale would apply to all indigent appellants-plaintiff and de-
fendant-and thus the question whether waiver of fees is a subsidy
may have become a nonissue with respect to all appeals.
IV. CANDIDATES FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
In Forma Pauperis APPEAL
16 6
A. The Strongest Candidates
The civil cases in which a constitutional right of informa pauperis
appeal is most likely to be declared are those that most closely
share the characteristics of a parental termination appeal. Heading
this list is an appeal by an indigent from a decree of involuntary
commitment to a mental institution on the ground that he suffers
from a mental illness that makes him a danger to himself or oth-
ers. In the oral argument of M.L.B., it was contended that
involuntary civil commitment might be the sole additional candi-
date for cost-free appeal. 167 While the rationale of M.L.B. is not so
limited, surely such a case is one of the strongest candidates for
requiring a waiver of appeal fees. First, like M.L.B., the Court's ju-
risprudence already recognizes that "civil commitment for any
purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that re-
quire[s] due process protection, ' 'l 68 and, like Mayer, it can result in
stigmatizing social consequences to the individual. 169 Second, like a
parental termination proceeding, the state exercises monopoly
power over involuntary civil commitment because the individual
has no alternative to defending himself in that proceeding in or-
der to retain his liberty. Third, waiving appeal fees in such a case
is not a state subsidy because the defendant is not seeking aid to
alleviate wealth disparity but instead, like a parent in a termina-
tion proceeding, is defending against the state's deprivation of his
166. As noted above, see supra note 3, this analysis is limited to civil cases in which the
state has afforded appeal as of right. It does not apply to appeals which are allowed only in
the discretion of the court. Discretionary appeals, such as a petition for writ of certiorari,
are poor candidates for a constitutional right to waiver of fees because, by definition, the
government has not afforded a right of appeal to anyone.
167. See Official Transcript, supra note 126, at *22.
168. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,425 (1979) (citation omitted).
169. See id. at 426.
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liberty and imposition of the brand associated with a mental illness
adjudication.
A weakness in this argument is that the deprivation of liberty in
an involuntary civil commitment decree is not necessarily perma-
nent, whereas the Court emphasized in M.L.B. that a decree
terminating a parent's status destroys the parent-child relationship
forever.170 As the Court has previously pointed out, once a person
has been committed to a mental institution, there will still be con-
tinuing observation and review of the patient's condition so that
an erroneous commitment can be corrected.' If this distinction
between permanent and indefinite deprivation were established by
the Court as the reason for rejecting a right of informa pauperis ap-
peal in civil commitment cases, then almost certainly M.L.B. would
be sui generis, because parental termination appears to be the only
civil proceeding in which a fundamental interest is permanently
destroyed. This result seems unlikely, however, because as a practi-
cal matter, the Court has consistently required similar procedural
protections in civil commitment and parental termination cases.172
Moreover, if permanent destruction of the asserted interest is an
absolute requirement, it would be difficult to explain why a cost-
free appeal must be afforded in all felony and misdemeanor cases,
because not all-in fact, relatively few-sentences in such cases
result in permanent deprivation of liberty.7 3 Thus, involuntary
commitment based on mental illness is a prime candidate for ex-
tension of a constitutional right of informa pauperis appeal in those
states, if any, that currently do not afford waiver of fees to indi-
gents.
Close on the heels of commitment based on mental illness is
civil commitment of persons determined to be violent sexual
predators. Some states have recently expanded civil commitment
proceedings to include repeat sexual offenders who, though not
suffering from mental illness, have a personality disorder that cre-
ates a likelihood of future violent sexual conduct. The Court, in a
recent decision upholding one such statute, characterized the pro-
ceeding as civil, rather than criminal, in nature. 174 The Court
acknowledged that such commitment deprives a person of free-
170. SeeM.L.B.,519U.S. atl21.
171. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 428-29.
172. For example, the Court has required a clear and convincing standard of proof in
both parental termination cases, see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769-70 (1982), and
involuntary civil commitment cases. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 431-33.
173. The only examples that come to mind are sentences of death and life without pa-
role.
174. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-69 (1997). For a list of states that have
adopted such statutes, see id. at 397-98 app. (Breyer,J., dissenting).
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dom from physical restraint that is at the core of liberty.1 5 Thus, a
fundamental interest is at stake in an appeal from a civil commit-
ment adjudication of a person determined to be a sexually violent
predator, as well as stigmatizing social consequences resulting
from such a determination. In addition, the state exercises mo-
nopoly power because a person alleged to be a sexually violent
predator has no alternative but to resist such a charge in order to
avoid commitment, and a person seeking waiver of appeal fees
seeks to defend against state-imposed restriction of liberty rather
than to obtain a subsidy to redress wealth disparity. As with mental
illness commitment, the only weakness in this argument is that
sexual predator commitment is not necessarily permanent because
the defendant can be released upon determination that his per-
sonality disorder has changed so that he no longer presents a
serious risk of future violent sexual conduct.176 As discussed above,
however, this distinction from parental termination appeals should
not be significant.1
7
An appeal by a minor female from a judgment denying her
permission to terminate her pregnancy also bears characteristics
closely analogous to a parental termination appeal. Although the
fundamental right of privacy encompasses a woman's decision to
terminate her pregnancy, 178 some states have enacted statutes re-
quiring minor females to obtain judicial approval prior to abortion
if their parents do not consent, and the Court has upheld such
statutes. 79 If a minor female petitions for permission to abort but is
denied at the trial level, the court's decision impairs her funda-
mental interest in choosing whether to bear the child. If the
decision stands, she will suffer a permanent deprivation of that in-
terest because she will be compelled to bear the child, so that her
right to choose has been lost forever.'80
Additionally, the minor female has no alternative to appeal,
because such statutes grant monopoly power to the state for
granting permission to abort. It is arguable, however, that waiver of
fees in such an appeal would run afoul of cases stating that the
Constitution does not require government to subsidize the
exercise of fundamental rights. In particular, the Court has held
175. See id. at 356.
176. See id. at 353.
177. See supra text accompanying note 173.
178. SeeRoe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
179. SeePlanned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 493 (1983).
180. In theory, she could have an abortion without permission, but in that event the
physician performing the abortion faces the prospect of criminal prosecution and impris-
onment. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 626 (1979).
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that government is not compelled to provide funding to pay for
indigent women's abortions. If that is so, one might argue that
waiver of appeal fees would also amount to requiring a state to
fund abortion. In this view, a minor female seeking permission to
abort is unlike a parent resisting termination, for she is not
defending against destruction of family bonds, but rather she is
seeking an affirmative decree allowing her to prevent the
formation of a family bond.
The counter to this argument, however, is quite persuasive. Re-
cent cases in which the Court has rejected constitutionally
mandated subsidies for privately initiated action all involved de-
mands that government pay for primarily private activity, such as
paying for an abortion.18 ' A minor female appealing denial of
permission to abort, however, is not demanding that government
pay for her abortion. Rather, she is asking that the state be re-
quired to remove an obstacle to the exercise of a fundamental
right that has been erected by the state itself-appeal fees. In this
respect, she is like the indigent petitioner in Boddie who sought
waiver of divorce filing fees.' The Boddie Court was not at all trou-
bled by the notion that waiver of filing fees is tantamount to a
subsidy but instead analogized a civil plaintiff subject to state mo-
nopolization over vindication of a fundamental right to a criminal
defendant; a civil plaintiffs resort to the courts for vindication of a
fundamental right is not voluntary at all.8 4 Faithfulness to the rea-
soning in Boddie, therefore, leads to the conclusion that a minor
female petitioner's invocation of mandatory judicial process is not
a voluntary act; hence, waiver of appeal fees does not constitute
government aid for privately initiated action, but rather it is a re-
quest to remove an obstacle erected by the government. Thus, an
appeal by an indigent minor female seeking permission to termi-
nate her pregnancy is a third strong candidate for a constitutional
right of in forma pauperis appeal.
Boddie, of course, is a reminder that the Court has declared that
a married person's decision whether to divorce is a fundamental
liberty interest over which the state exercises monopoly power. s5
Therefore, a fourth strong candidate for cost-free appeal is an in-
digent seeking review of a decision granting divorce. As in parental
termination, in a divorce action a fundamental right is at stake,
181. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326-27 (1980).
182. See, e.g., id.
183. SeeBoddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375-77 (1971).
184. See id. at 374, 376, 383.
185. See id. at 374-76.
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appeal is the only available avenue of redress, and the appellant
seeks to prevent state destruction of the family tie.'
8 6
One state court, however, has recently noted that "divorce cases
are not the type of civil proceeding in which the state is obligated
to provide a transcript to either party at state expense,"1 87 and that
M.L.B. is confined to criminal, quasi-criminal, and parental termi-
nation appeals. That position seems questionable, however,
because destruction of a fundamental interest is at stake. The pri-
mary bases for distinguishing between divorce and parental
termination arose in the oral argument of M.L.B. Several Justices
pressed petitioner's counsel with the question whether cost-free
appeal, if required in parental termination cases, would also be
required in fault divorce cases. Counsel attempted to distinguish
divorce on the ground that termination of marriage is not perma-
nent because the partners are free to remarry, whereas
termination of parental status is permanent. As one Justice pointed
out, however, the rationale of Boddie is that a fundamental interest
in choosing whether to remain married is at stake in a divorce ac-
tion. 88 This basis of distinction nevertheless found its way into the
opinion in M.L.B., where the Court stated that what sets parental
termination apart from divorce is that termination permanently
destroys the parent-child relationship, whereas the divorced part-
ners are free to reconcile and remarry."'9 The difficulty with this
distinction, however, is that a divorce decree permanently destroys
the marriage previously entered into, just as a termination decree
permanently destroys a preexisting parent-child relationship. It is
certainly true that divorced partners are free to enter into a new
marriage relationship, but it is also true that a parent whose rela-
tionship with a child has been terminated may be free to attempt
to reestablish that relationship at a later date through a petition to
adopt. It perhaps will be far more difficult to obtain such an adop-
tion than to remarry, but if there is no legal bar to it and a parent
proves that circumstances have changed such that she is now a fit
parent and adoption is in the child's best interest, adoption could
be granted. Thus, termination and divorce cannot be distin-
guished on the ground that one cannot be remedied while the
186. Such an issue is most likely to arise in states that still require a showing of fault in
order to divorce. Even in a "no-fault" divorce state, however, one spouse might seek to ap-
peal the terms of the divorce that were granted by the trial court. In such a case, the issue of
fee waiver would arise if the appellant were indigent.
187. Tuttle v. Tuttle, No. 01A01-9512-CV-00546, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 685, at *5 n.4
(Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 1997).
188. See Official Transcript, supra note 126, at *50-53.
189. SeeM.L.B., 519 U.S. at 127-28.
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other can but only on the ground that the remedy of adoption is
more difficult.
Another Justice suggested a different basis for distinguishing di-
vorce from termination: In a divorce case, at least one spouse is
asking the state to give her something-a divorce decree-whereas
in a termination case the parent 'just wants to be spared from the
State taking away her child."' 90 This distinction, however, miscon-
ceives the status of a spouse who appeals a divorce decree, for he
also seeks to be spared state-mandated destruction of his marriage.
On principle then, an indigent spouse appealing a fault divorce
decree may well qualify for informa pauperis appeal.
The Court has consistently recognized that personal choices
about family relationships are fundamental to liberty in an ordered
society."" If this fundamental right is broad enough to encompass
the creation of a family relationship through marriage and pro-
creation,'192 it should also include the choice to adopt a child. 193 If
this is so, then appeal by indigent persons from denial of a petition
to adopt would also merit informa pauperis treatment. A fundamen-
tal interest in creation of a family relationship is at stake; indeed,
the parent-child relationship is implicated. The petitioners can
adopt the child only by invoking the state's judicial processes. The
denial of adoption permanently destroys petitioner's attempt to
create the parent-child relationship. Although they could file a
new petition to adopt at a later date, the same is true of a parent
whose rights have been terminated; in either case, destruction of
the attempt to preserve or create a parent-child relationship, as a
result of the decision sought to be appealed, is permanent. One
might distinguish adoption from termination on the ground that,
unlike permission to abort or to divorce, petitioners are asking the
government to give them something-a child. As previously dis-
cussed with respect to abortion and divorce, 94 however, persons
seeking permission to adopt a child do not voluntarily resort to
judicial process, because the state has monopoly power over adop-
tion; moreover, they are not asking that the government pay the
costs of adoption 95 but only that the state-imposed obstacle of ap-
peal fees be removed.
190. Official Transcript, supra note 126, at *53.
191. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (discussing marriage); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (discussing procreation).
192. See supra note 171.
193. Cf Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13 (1981) (holding that, in the context of a pater-
nity proceeding, both defendant and child have a substantial interest in the creation of a
parent-child relationship and a compelling interest in accuracy of adjudication).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 181-190.
195. An example of such costs are adoption agency referral fees.
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Finally, the Court has ruled that a terminally ill patient has a
fundamental right to decide whether to order removal of life-
sustaining equipment.' 96 If an indigent patient made such a deci-
sion but the medical personnel refused to carry it out, and the
patient filed suit to require withdrawal of the equipment but re-
ceived an adverse decision, an appeal would be likely to qualify for
in forma pauperis treatment. The patient's fundamental interest in
deciding to withdraw the equipment is at stake, and the trial court
decision will likely destroy that interest because the patient will be
forced to live with the equipment turned on.
B. The Plausible Candidates
Although the Court's opinion in M.L.B. placed great emphasis
on the fact that a fundamental liberty interest was at stake in the
appeal, the actual holding is that such an interest is sufficient to
trigger strict scrutiny of a state's interest in imposing appeal fees
on indigent persons. 97 The Court did not state, even in dictum, that
a fundamental interest is a necessary precondition to an in forma
pauperis appeal. Indeed, by bracketing the importance of the par-
ent-child relationship with the interests at stake in a misdemeanor
appeal (a fine and possible collateral consequences), the Court
opened the possibility that other interests, while not deemed fun-
damental, may be considered sufficiently important to demand at
least intermediate-level scrutiny of a state's justification for requir-
ing payment of appeal costs. By way of illustration, two such
cases-both dealing with domestic relations-would be plausible
candidates for such treatment.
The first of these cases is an appeal from a decision finding that
a person is the parent of an illegitimate child and therefore must
pay child support. The Court has held that both the child and pu-
tative parent have a substantial interest at stake in a paternity
action-creation of a parent-child relationship-and have a
"compelling interest in the accuracy of such a determination."198
Moreover, a finding of paternity creates the parent-child relation-
ship as permanently as termination destroys it. At the M.L.B. oral
argument, the Justices asked whether a right of cost-free appeal, if
extended to parental termination appeals, would also extend to
196. SeeCruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 265, 278 (1990).
197. SeeM.L.B., 519 U.S. at 116-17.
198. Little, 452 U.S. at 13 (citation omitted).
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paternity appeals. While conceding the two cases are very close,
petitioner's counsel distinguished the two cases on the ground that
blood tests can determine paternity with near-certainty so that a
transcript would rarely be needed.'9 The Court itself, however, has
noted that blood tests have a margin of error close to ten per-
cent,200 so that a transcript of the other evidence introduced at trial
may well be needed in a particular case. Moreover, an indigent
putative parent might also be unable to afford other state-imposed
appeal costs, such as filing fees, so that the accuracy of blood tests
would not render the issue of costs moot.
At the M.L.B. oral argument, one Justice stated that paternity is
like the general run of civil cases in that mere money is at stake.
However, the Court has also stated that, apart from financial obli-
gations, the interest at stake in a paternity proceeding is the
creation of a parent-child relationship. 1 Moreover, the Court has
characterized paternity as "quasi-criminal" in nature because fail-
ure to pay support can result in imprisonment.20 2 The distinction
between paternity and termination that found its way into the
Court's opinion in M.L.B. is that a decree of paternity does not
destroy a preexisting relationship but merely imposes financial ob-
ligations, since a defendant resisting paternity disavows emotional
ties to the child, whereas termination destroys an established
bond.00 While this distinction may be sufficient to rebut the argu-
ment that a fundamental interest is at stake in a paternity action, it
remains established in the Court's jurisprudence that an extremely
important interest in an accurate determination of a parent-child
relationship is at stake.0 4 If this is so, then at least an intermediate
level of scrutiny ought to be employed for weighing a state's justifi-
cation for barring paternity appeals by persons unable to pay state-
imposed appeal costs.
A second plausible candidate for in forma pauperis status is an
appeal by one parent from an award of child custody to the other
parent. It is clear that a parent has a fundamental interest in hav-
ing custody of her child. 20 5 The Court in M.L.B., however,
distinguished loss of custody from termination in that the former
does not destroy the parent-child bond but only infringes upon it
199. SeeOfficial Transcript, supra note 126, at *12-14.
200. See Little, 452 U.S. at 8.
201. See id. at 13.
202. See id. at 10.
203. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 118 n.11 (citations omitted).
204. See Little, 452 U.S. at 13.
205. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510,534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923).
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and that an award of custody can be modified, such that the depri-
vation of a parent's fundamental interest is both less severe and
impermanent.20 6 The Court's characterization of a loss of custody
may be accurate for the general run of custody cases, making such
cases poor candidates for a waiver of appeal fees in the foreseeable
future.
There are particular cases, however, in which an award of cus-
tody will result in virtually total and permanent loss of custody. For
example, if a court awarded custody of a child to a parent who in-
tended to reside in a foreign country whose laws were hostile to
change of custody, or if one parent snatched a child from the cus-
todial parent in a foreign country, the losing parent would have
lost, in a very real sense, her fundamental interest in custody once
the child was transported to that foreign country.2°7 It would be
difficult to argue that such a case should not be bracketed with a
misdemeanor case like Mayer, in which only a fine and potential
collateral consequences are at stake. Thus, a strong argument can
be made that if, in a particular case, an award of custody would re-
sult in a severe and possibly permanent loss of custody, at least an
intermediate level of scrutiny should be applied to the state's in-
terest in imposing appeal fees.08
If the Court were willing to employ intermediate scrutiny of a
state's interest in requiring payment of appeal fees, the issue would
be whether such fees bear a substantial relationship to an impor-
tant state interest.29 The usual justification for such fees is that they
206. SeeM.L.B., 519 U.S. at 127-28.
207. Just such a case was recently reported in the Washington Post. See Roxanne Roberts,
Two Boys and a Border; Catherine Meyer Lost Her Sons. Now She's in a Bitter International Custody
War, WASH. POST,June 29, 1998, at B1, available in 1998 WL 11589180. A mother in Britain,
separated from her husband, sent her sons to visit him in Germany. He refused to return
them, and she has fought legal battles for four years to regain custody. See id. The mother,
now the wife of the British Ambassador to the United States, has had the resources to con-
tinue her legal battles, which have been unsuccessful as of press time. Had she been
indigent, she would have had no legal recourse at all if required to pay court costs. This is
not an isolated case. There are reportedly "thousands of cases a year in which mothers and
fathers take their kids to a foreign country-including the United States-and then use
local courts to keep them." Id.
208. Cf Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18,31-32 (1981) (holding that whether
an indigent parent in a termination case is entitled to appointed counsel is to be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis). This analysis is as applicable to an appeal from an award of
temporary custody as it is to an appeal from an award of permanent custody. An award of
temporary custody is a major step toward an award of permanent custody because courts
tend to give permanent custody to the parent who has had primary responsibility for child
care and are reluctant to disturb the status quo in such cases.
209. See, e.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 750-51 (1984) (holding that a tempo-
rary extension of a gender-based classification serves an important interest in protecting a
group of persons who retired in reliance on such classification); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
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help pay the costs of operating the court system. '10 Assuming that
this is an important state interest, the key question would be
whether waiver of fees in particular categories of appeals would
impose an undue burden on defraying operating costs. The most
significant factor in making such a determination would be how
many appeals by persons seeking waiver of fees could be ex-
pected.2 1 With respect to paternity appeals, for example, the
crucial inquiry would be how many such appeals could be ex-
pected relative to the total number of appeals. If the proportion of
paternity appeals by indigents is low, waiver of fees for such ap-
peals is unlikely to impair significantly a state's ability to offset the
costs of operating its court system.
C. Weak Candidates
Appeals in which neither fundamental nor unusually important
interests are at stake are unlikely to be accorded constitutional in
forma pauperis status any time soon. The Court's decisions in Ort-
wein and M.L.B. draw a line between appeals which affect general
economic and social interests and those which implicate constitu-
tionally protected fundamental interests; in the former, indigent
persons have no constitutional right to waiver of fees, but in the
latter they do. The Court in M.L.B. viewed the history of its juris-
prudence concerning access to the courts as establishing "a narrow
category of civil cases in which the State must provide access to its
judicial processes without regard to a party's ability to pay court
fees," that "a constitutional requirement to waive court fees in civil
cases is the exception, not the general rule," and that such a re-
quirement does not extend to "the broad array of civil cases."212 In
holding that the fundamental interest in maintaining the parent-
child bond sets parental termination appeals apart from civil ap-
peals in general, the Court emphasized that "we do not question
the general rule, stated in Ortwein, that fee requirements ordinarily
are examined only for rationality.... The State's need for revenue
to offset costs, in the mine run of cases, satisfies the rationality re-
quirement ....,,21 Lower courts have, since M.L.B., consistently
190, 197, 204 (1976) (holding that a state law permitting the sale of beer to eighteen-year
old women, but requiring males to be twenty-one, serves no substantial state interest).
210. SeeKras, 409 U.S. at 447-49.
211. Cf.M.L.B.,519U.S. at122.
212. Id. at 113-14, 116.
213. Id. at 123.
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interpreted the decision as requiring waiver of appeal fees only in
cases in which a fundamental interest is at stake. 4
In the long run, however, the rationale of M.L.B. may not be so
limited. The Court's extension of a constitutional right of informa
pauperis appeal from criminal to civil cases was the first of its kind,
and the "key case," said the Court, was Mayer, which established
that the right to waiver of fees was not limited to cases where
physical liberty was at stake, but also extended to "quasicriminal"
cases which could entail "serious collateral consequences. ",2 5 The
consideration linking Mayer to M.L.B., according to the Court, is
that the stakes in both misdemeanor and parental termination ap-
peals are larger than the loss of money; the former could affect the
defendant's "professional prospects," and the latter will destroy the
parent-child bond . Although no fundamental interest was at
stake in Mayer, it, like M.L.B., implicated an interest-pursuit of
one's livelihood-that was sufficiently important to distinguish it
from appeals in which money alone is at stake. 7 If this is so, then
surely the dissent in M.L.B. was correct in noting that, if Mayer
provides the rationale for extending the prohibition against im-
posing appeal fees on poor people to civil cases, many other civil
appeals also affect important nonmonetary interests: paternity,
custody, divorce, zoning, and foreclosure, for example.
More fundamentally, with M.L.B.'s resurrection of the theory that
the requirements of due process and equal protection converge
when an indigent person would be blocked from appealing because
she is unable to afford court costs, the Court has acknowledged that
two important interests are at stake in any civil appeal. The due
process concern involves the relationship between the state and the
individual and requires the state to afford fair procedure to the indi-
vidual. The question whether a given procedure is fair can be
answered only by first determining the purpose the procedure is de-
signed to achieve, which for an appeal is to assure accuracy in fact-
finding and law formulation. Even if the interest in assuring accu-
racy is not fundamental enough to mandate a constitutional right of
appeal,1 9 once a state creates a right to appeal, surely it has created
214. See, e.g., Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1997) (upholding the
"three strikes" provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (1994)); Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 232
n.1, 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (upholding the same statute).
215. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 111-12 (citations omitted).
216. Seeid. at 121.
217. SeeMayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1971).
218. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 141-43 (Thomas,J, dissenting) (citations omitted).
219. See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) (holding that, since there is no
constitutional right of appeal, a state may impose such conditions on appeal as it deems
appropriate).
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an important interest in assuring that the trial-level decision was not
erroneous. The equal protection concern, on the other hand, in-
volves the relationship between different classes of appellants and
prohibits a state from invidiously denying a substantial benefit to
one class while making it available to another class. The benefit of
an appeal, that a state may not arbitrarily deny one class while af-
fording it to other classes, is to correct error. Thus, once a state
creates a right to appeal, it has created a second important inter-
est-equal opportunity to correct error.
Ultimately, then, recognition that due process and equal protection
concerns converge upon issues of access to court entails a conclusion
that every civil appeal, whether the appellant's asserted interest is fun-
damental or not, involves two important interests: reducing the risk of
erroneous results and affording equal opportunity to correct error. A
state's purported interest in defraying the costs of its court system by
requiring appellants to pay fees should be weighed against not merely
the substantive interest a particular appellant seeks to vindicate, but
against these two important interests of every appellant. An empirical
accounting would be needed, but it is likely that, if one compared the
total cost of operating a court system to the revenue generated by ap-
peal fees, the resulting ratio would be so minute as to lead to the
conclusion that the marginal revenue benefit derived from appeal fees
is outweighed by the untold lost opportunities to correct error created
by imposing such fees upon the poor. The harm that results from de-
nying poor people the opportunity to correct error is not merely that
abstract legal error will remain on the record. More fundamentally, it
undermines the moral legitimacy of the courts in the hearts and
minds of the poor.""
CONCLUSION
The decision in M.L.B. v. S.L.J. has extended a constitutional
right of in forma pauperis appeal to civil cases for the first time. The
tightly circumscribed nature of the Court's opinion makes it likely
that, for the near term at least, such a right will be confined to civil
appeals in which a fundamental interest is at stake. Parental termina-
tion appeals are not likely to be the only type of civil case to which
such a right will soon be extended, because other civil appeals, such
220. See Mayer, 404 U.S. at 197-98 ("Arbitrary denial of appellate review of proceedings
of the State's lowest trial courts may save the State some dollars and cents, but only at the
substantial risk of generating frustration and hostility toward its courts among the most
numerous consumers ofjustice.").
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as involuntary commitment, also implicate fundamental interests.
Moreover, although in recent years the Court has been hesitant to
establish any new fundamental rights, 2 1 it has done so, 22  and the
denial of any such newly declared fundamental interests would be
prime candidates for a waiver of appeal fees.22 In the long run,
moreover, the recognition in M.L.B. that waiver of appeal fees for
the poor is not a subsidy, but rather removal of a state-imposed ob-
stacle to vindication of rights and that the ultimate interest at stake
in any appeal is equal opportunity to correct error should one day
lead to establishment of a general constitutional right of in forma
pauperis appeal. As Justice Hugo Black said over a quarter-century
ago, "people might recognize that this constitutional decision will
eventually extend to all civil cases but believe that it can only be en-
forced slowly step by step, so that the country will have time to
absorb its full import. 2 2 4 Perhaps Justice Black, near the end of his
career and life, reached this conclusion because he believed that, if
the Constitution guarantees all persons equal access to the courts,
such a guarantee should not depend upon finely spun evaluations of
the relative worth of legal rights, but rather upon a moral principle
thatjustice should not be for sale.225
221. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding that there is no fun-
damental right to assisted suicide).
222. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973) (establishing the fundamental right to
choose whether to terminate a pregnancy).
223. For example, in Crnzan v. Dinetor, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), the
Court held that the constitutionally protected liberty interest includes the decision of a terminally
ill patient to withdraw life-sustaining equipment. See id. at 278. As argued supra text accompanying
note 196, a decision to deny directed withdrawal deprives the patient of a fundamental right, and
therefore this newly recognized right would give rise to a constitutional right to appeal informa
pauperis if the patient were indigent.
224. Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 956 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (contending that the Court's recent decision in Boddie v. Connecticut should be
extended to all civil cases).
225. Justice Black wrote the Court's opinion in Griffin v. Ilinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), in which
he argued that the Constitution prohibits invidious discrimination against the poor in denying
them access to court. See id. at 18. In Godberg v. Kely, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), however, he argued in
dissent that the Constitution does not guarantee the poor the right to a hearing prior to termina-
tion of welfare benefits. See id. at 276-77 (BlackJ., dissenting). At first glance, it seems inconsistent
to support the right of indigents to have access to the courts yet to deny the same class of people
access to a welfare hearing, for the fundamental fairness guaranteed by due process would seem to
be at stake in both cases. Justice Black, however, was well-known for his hostility to using due proc-
ess as a vehicle for judges to impose their own ideas of fair and reasonable procedure. See, e.g.,
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 325 (1945) (Black, J., concurring). He was
equally fervent in his belief in "the basic principle that all people must stand on an equality before
the bar ofjustice in every American court." Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940). IfJus-
tice Black came to believe, at the end of his career, that it is equal protection that guarantees the
poor the same access to the courts as all other people, then it would not be inconsistent for him to
support cost-free appeal for the poor when appeal is available to everyone but to deny the right to
a welfare hearing when such a hearing is available to nobody.
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